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Abstract 
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differentiated product markets. This approach explains a variety of features exhibited in 
disaggregated trade data, including the higher productivity of exporters relative to non-
exporters, within-industry reallocations of resources following trade liberalization, and 
patterns of trade participation across firms and destination markets. Accounting for these 
empirical patterns reveals new mechanisms through which the aggregate economy is affected 
by trade liberalization, including endogenous increases in average industry and firm 
productivity. 
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1 Introduction
Theoretical research in international trade increasingly emphasizes firm-level decisions in under-
standing the causes and consequences of aggregate trade. Motivated by empirical findings using
micro level data on plants and firms, this theoretical literature emphasizes heterogeneity in produc-
tivity, size and other characteristics even within narrowly-defined industries. This heterogeneity
is systematically related to trade participation, with exporters larger and more productive than
non-exporters even prior to entering export markets. Trade liberalization leads to within-industry
reallocations of resources, which raise average industry productivity, as low-productivity firms exit
and high-productivity firms expand to enter export markets. The increase in firm scale induced
by export market entry enhances the return to complementary productivity-enhancing investments
in technology adoption and innovation, with the result that trade liberalization also raises firm
productivity.
Models of firm heterogeneity provide a natural explanation for these and other features of disag-
gregated trade data that cannot be directly interpreted using representative firm models (whether
based on comparative advantage or love of variety). From a positive perspective, accounting for
these features of disaggregated trade enhances the predictive power of our models for patterns of
trade and production. More broadly, theories of firm heterogeneity and trade have improved our
understanding of the mechanisms through which an economy responds to trade. This is especially
important from a policy perspective: For example, identifying potential winners and losers from
trade liberalization, and generating counterfactual predictions for changes in policies related to
trade. Finally, from a normative view, understanding all of the margins along which an econ-
omy adjusts to trade can be important for evaluating the overall welfare gains from trade. As
we show more formally below, it is only under strong conditions that aggregate outcomes (at the
sector or country level) are sufficient statistics for the overall welfare gains from trade. Even when
these strong conditions hold, heterogeneous and homogeneous firm models can have quite different
distributional implications for wage inequality, unemployment and the political economy of trade
protection.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews empirical evidence from
micro data that motivates theories of heterogeneous firms and trade. Section 3 introduces a general
theoretical framework for modeling firm heterogeneity in differentiated product markets. Section
4 characterizes the model’s closed economy equilibrium, while Section 5 examines the implications
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of opening to trade. In Section 6 we parameterize the firm productivity distribution and examine
the model’s quantitative predictions. Section 7 embeds this model of firm heterogeneity within the
integrated equilibrium framework of neoclassical trade theory. Section 8 relaxes the assumption of
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences to introduce variable mark-ups and examine
the effects of market size on the selection of firms into production and exporting. Section 9 explores
a variety of extensions, where firm productivity is also endogenous. Section 10 discusses factor
markets and the income distributional consequences of trade liberalization. Section 11 concludes.
2 Empirical Evidence
The theoretical literature on firm heterogeneity and trade has been influenced by a number of
empirical findings from micro data. One first set of empirical findings showed that firms partici-
pating in trade perform better along a number of dimensions. Using U.S. Census data, Bernard
and Jensen (1995, 1999) find that exporters are larger, more productive, more capital intensive,
more skill intensive and pay higher wages than non-exporters within the same industry. While the
early empirical literature using plant and firm data focused on exports, more recent research using
customs transactions data has shown that importers display many of the same characteristics as
exporters. Indeed, firms that simultaneously export and import typically exhibit the highest levels
of performance (see for example Bernard et al. 2007, 2009).1
A second set of empirical results highlights the prominence of compositional effects across firms
(within sectors). Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989) show that around one third of U.S. manu-
facturing plants enter and exit every five years. Exitors are smaller on average than incumbents and
new entrants have higher average employment growth rates conditional on survival than incum-
bents, consistent with a Darwinian process of selection operating across plants and firms. Davis and
Haltiwanger (1992) find that gross job creation and destruction across plants are much larger than
would be needed to achieve the observed net changes in employment between industries, implying
substantial reallocations within rather than across industries. Evidence that such compositional
changes are important for the effects of trade liberalizations comes from a number of large-scale
liberalization reforms. In the aftermath of the Chilean trade liberalization, Pavcnik (2002) finds
1These findings have been replicated for many countries, as discussed for example in Mayer and Ottaviano (2007)
and World Trade Organization (2008). Following Bernard and Jensen (1999) a large empirical literature has sought to
disentangle whether good firm performance causes exporting (selection into exporting) or exporting causes good firm
performance (learning by exporting). The consensus from this literature is that there is strong evidence of selection
into exporting. More recently, a number of studies have found evidence suggesting that exporting influences firm
performance, as discussed below.
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that roughly two thirds of the 19 percent increase in aggregate productivity is the result of the
reallocation of resources from less to more efficient producers. While early empirical studies focused
on documenting these compositional effects and contrasting export-orientated, import-competing
and non-traded industries, more recent research has connected intra-industry reallocation to direct
policy measures of trade liberalization such as import tariffs. Following the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (CUSFTA), Trefler (2004) finds that industries experiencing the deepest Canadian tariff
cuts reduced employment by 12 percent but increased labor productivity by 15 percent.2
While the above empirical studies focus on reallocation in production, other related research
emphasizes the role of firm and product margins in understanding patterns of trade. Using French
export data by firm and destination market, Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) find that more
than 60 percent of the variation in exports across markets of different size is explained by the
extensive margin of the number of exporting firms. Using U.S. export data by firm, product
and destination market, Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011) show that all of the negative effect
of distance on bilateral trade flows is accounted for by the extensive margins of the number of
exporting firms and exported products. Therefore, larger aggregate trade flows are not achieved
by a simple scaling up of trade at the disaggregated level, but rather involve substantial entry, exit
and reallocations of market shares across suppliers to different markets.
A third set of empirical findings provides evidence that plant or firm performance responds to
the trading environment along a number of dimensions including overall productivity, technology
adoption, the number and type of products supplied, and mark-ups of price over marginal cost.
In Pavcnik (2002), one third of the increase in aggregate productivity following Chilean trade
liberalization is attributed to increases in productivity within plants. Bustos (2011) and Lileeva
and Trefler (2012) find that the entry into export markets induced by foreign trade liberalization
stimulates the adoption of new technologies. Baldwin and Gu (2009) and Bernard, Redding and
Schott (2011) show that Canadian plants and U.S. firms respectively rationalize product scope
following CUSFTA. Levinsohn (1993) and Harrison (1994) find pro-competitive effects of trade
liberalization in reducing mark-ups in Turkey and Cote d’Ivoire respectively. De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012) uncover differences in mark-ups between exporters and non-exporters.
In the next section, we introduce a general theoretical framework for modeling firm hetero-
geneity in differentiated product markets that accounts for many of the empirical features outlined
2For evidence from trade reforms in Colombia, India and the U.S., see respectively Fernandes (2007), Khandelwal
and Topalova (2011), and Bernard et al. (2006).
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above. In particular, the model rationalizes performance differences between exporters and non-
exporters, the contribution of exit and reallocation to aggregate productivity growth following trade
liberalization, and the role of compositional changes in patterns of bilateral trade. Naturally, the
model is an abstraction and does not capture all of the features of the data. For example, the base-
line version of the model assumes constant mark-ups, and hence abstracts from pro-competitive
effects of trade liberalization, although we relax this assumption in a later section. Furthermore,
much of our analysis concentrates on heterogeneity in productivity and size across firms, and hence
does not capture the rich range of dimensions along which trading and non-trading firms can differ.
Additionally, the baseline version of the model yields sharp predictions such as a single productivity
threshold above which all firms export and a stable ranking of the sales of exporting firms across all
destination markets. Although these sharp predictions are unlikely to be literally satisfied in the
data, they capture systematic relationships or average tendencies in the data, such as the higher
average productivity of exporters and the correlation of relative exporter sales across destination
markets.
3 General Setup
We begin by outlining a general framework for modeling firm heterogeneity following Melitz (2003).3
Throughout this chapter, we rely on models of monopolistic competition that emphasize product
differentiation and increasing returns to scale at the level of the firm. Although this framework
provides a tractable platform for analyzing a host of firm decisions in general equilibrium, it ne-
glects strategic interactions between firms. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) develop a
heterogeneous firm framework that features head to head competition between firms, while Neary
(2010) surveys the literature on oligopoly and trade in general equilibrium. In our monopolistic
competition framework, all interactions between firms operate through market indices such as the
mass of competing firms, and statistics of the price distribution. We begin by developing the indus-
try equilibrium with heterogeneous firms, before embedding the sectors in general equilibrium. We
start with a closed economy and then examine the implications of opening to international trade.
To highlight the implications of firm heterogeneity as starkly as possible, we begin by considering
a static (one-period) model, before turning to consider dynamics in a later section.4
3An accompanying web appendix contains the technical derivations of results reported in this chapter.
4For another review of the theoretical literature on firm heterogeneity and trade see Redding (2011), while Bernard
et al. (2012) survey the empirical evidence.
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Preferences
Consumer preferences are defined over the consumption of goods produced in a number of sectors
j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , J}:
U =
J∑
j=0
βj logQj ,
J∑
j=0
βj = 1, βj ≥ 0. (1)
Sector j = 0 is a homogeneous good, which is produced with a unit input requirement and is chosen
as the numeraire. In some cases, we will require that β0 is large enough that all countries produce
this good in the open economy equilibrium. Within each of the remaining j ≥ 1 sectors, there is a
continuum of horizontally differentiated varieties, and preferences are assumed to take the Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) form:
Qj =
[∫
ω∈Ωj
qj(ω)
(σj−1)/σjdω
]σj/(σj−1)
, σj > 1, j ≥ 1. (2)
This representation of consumer preferences, in which varieties enter utility symmetrically, implic-
itly imposes a choice of units in which to measure the quantity of each variety. There is no necessary
relationship between this normalization and the units in which physical quantities of output are
measured for each product in the data. Mapping physical quantities of output back to utility re-
quires taking a stand on the relative weight of products in utility, which depends (among other
things) on product quality.5
Using Y to denote aggregate income, the Cobb-Douglas upper tier of utility implies that con-
sumers spend Xj = βjY on goods produced by sector j. The demand for each differentiated variety
within sector j is given by:
qj(ω) = Ajpj(ω)
−σj , Aj = XjP
σj−1
j ,
where Pj is the price index dual to (2):
Pj =
[∫
ω∈Ωj
p(ω)1−σjdω
]1/(1−σj)
.
Aj is an index of market demand that proportionally scales every firm’s residual demand. This
5In some cases quality can be directly measured as for wine (see Crozet, Head, and Mayer, 2012) or inferred from
input use such as in Kugler and Verhoogen (2012). Alternatively, functional form assumptions can be made about
the mapping between physical and utility units as in Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) and Johnson (2012).
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market demand index, in turn, is determined by sector spending and a statistic of the price distri-
bution (the CES price index). With a continuum of firms, each firm is of measure zero relative to
the market as a whole, and hence takes Aj as given.
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Technology
Varieties are produced using a composite factor of production Lj with unit cost wj in sector j. This
composite factor, for example, can be a Cobb-Douglas function of skilled labor (S) and unskilled
labor (U): Lj = η¯jS
ηj
j U
1−ηj
j ; η¯j is a constant such that unit cost is wj = w
ηj
S w
1−ηj
U , where wS
and wU are the skilled and unskilled wage. We index the unit cost by sector j, because even
if factor prices are equalized across sectors in competitive factor markets, unit costs will still in
general differ across sectors due to differences in factor intensity. The composite factor (with the
same aggregation of labor inputs) is used for all productive activities within the industry, including
both variable and fixed costs (incurred for overhead production as well as for entry and market
access).7 Thus, we can define a sector’s aggregate supply Lj for this composite factor. In our
multi-sector setting, the input supply Lj to each sector is determined endogenously. In several
instances where we wish to characterize how inputs are allocated across sectors, we will assume a
single homogeneous labor factor, in which case the input supplies Lj can be summed across sectors
and set equal to the country’s aggregate labor endowment.
Within each industry, each firm chooses to supply a distinct horizontally-differentiated variety.
Production of each variety involves a fixed production cost of fj units of the composite input and
a constant marginal cost that is inversely proportional to firm productivity ϕ. The total amount
of the composite input required to produce qj units of a variety is therefore:
lj = fj +
qj
ϕ
.
Since all firms with the same productivity within a given sector behave symmetrically, we index firms
within a sector from now onwards by ϕ alone. The homogeneous numeraire sector is characterized
by perfect competition and is produced one for one with the composite factor, so that w0 = 1.
6While most of the firm heterogeneity literature assumes monopolistic competition with a continuum of firms, the
case of a finite number of firms introduces a number of additional issues. If firms are large relative to the market
(“granular”), idiosyncratic shocks to individual firms influence aggregate volatility, as in di Giovanni and Levchenko
(2011). If granular firms internalize the effects of their price choices on the aggregate price index, they charge variable
mark-ups even under CES preferences, as in Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Edmond et al (2012).
7See Flam and Helpman (1987) for an analysis of non-homothetic production technologies where fixed and variable
costs can have different factor intensities.
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Firm Behavior
We now focus on equilibrium in a given sector and drop the sector j subscript to avoid notational
clutter. The market structure is monopolistic competition. Each firm chooses its price to maximize
its profits subject to a downward-sloping residual demand curve with constant elasticity σ. From
the first-order condition for profit maximization, the equilibrium price for each variety is a constant
mark-up over marginal cost:
p(ϕ) =
σ
σ − 1
w
ϕ
,
which implies an equilibrium firm revenue of:
r(ϕ) = Ap(ϕ)1−σ = A
(
σ − 1
σ
)σ−1
w1−σϕσ−1,
and an equilibrium firm profit of:
pi(ϕ) =
r(ϕ)
σ
− wf = Bϕσ−1 − wf, B = (σ − 1)
σ−1
σσ
w1−σA.
This constant mark-up of price over marginal cost is an implication of CES preferences and monop-
olistic competition, and ensures that higher firm productivity is passed on fully to consumers in the
form of a lower price. Since demand is elastic, this lower price implies higher revenue for more pro-
ductive firms. While we focus on productivity as the source of revenue heterogeneity across firms,
heterogeneity in product quality across firms can be captured by relaxing the assumption that va-
rieties enter preferences symmetrically in (2) and introducing a CES weighting parameter for each
variety. Under our assumption of CES preferences and monopolistic competition, productivity and
product quality are isomorphic in the sense that they both enter equilibrium firm revenue in exactly
the same way.8 Together constant mark-ups and the homothetic production technology (the ratio
of average to marginal cost depends solely on firm output) imply that ‘variable’ or ‘gross’ profits
are a constant proportion of firm revenue. Therefore the market demand index A proportionally
scales both revenues and gross profits.
8While more productive, larger firms charge lower prices in the model, care should be taken in interpreting this
prediction in the data, since as noted above the choice of units imposed by the symmetric representation of preferences
(2) does not necessarily correspond to the units in which physical quantities are measured in the data. One potential
explanation for more productive, larger firms charging higher prices in the data is that they produce higher quality
varieties and producing higher quality involves higher marginal costs, as in Baldwin and Harrigan (2011), Johnson
(2012), Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) and Manova and Zhang (2012).
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Firm Performance Measures and Productivity
A key implication of the CES demand structure is that the relative outputs and revenues of firms
depend solely on their relative productivities:
q(ϕ1)
q(ϕ2)
=
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)σ
,
r(ϕ1)
r(ϕ2)
=
(
ϕ1
ϕ2
)σ−1
, ϕ1, ϕ2 > 0.
where a higher elasticity of substitution implies greater differences in size and profitability between
firms for a given difference in relative productivity.
Empirical measures of firm or plant revenue-based productivity (e.g. based on deflating sales
or value-added with firm-specific price deflators) are monotonically related to the firm productivity
draw ϕ. Since prices are inversely related to the firm productivity draw ϕ, revenue per variable
input is constant across firms. Revenue-based productivity, however, varies because of the fixed
production cost:
r(ϕ)
l(ϕ)
=
wσ
σ − 1
[
1− f
l(ϕ)
]
,
where input use l(ϕ) increases monotonically with ϕ. A higher productivity draw increases variable
input use and revenue, with the result that the fixed input requirement is spread over more units
of revenue.9
Productivity ϕ is a catch-all that includes all sources of heterogeneity in revenue relative to
factor inputs across firms, including differences in technical efficiency, management practice, firm
organization, and product quality. For most of our analysis, we take firm productivity as exoge-
nously determined upon entry. In later sections, we consider several extensions of our general
framework that introduce an endogenous component to firm productivity and model its evolu-
tion over time. Opening further the black box of the firm remains an interesting area for further
research, including the microfoundations of heterogeneity in firm productivity and the dynamics
of firm productivity over time. While CES preferences and monopolistic competition imply that
productivity and product quality enter equilibrium firm revenue in exactly the same way, different
sources of revenue heterogeneity could have different implications in other frameworks. Further-
more, there are many other dimensions along which firms can be heterogeneous besides revenue
per unit of input (e.g. factor intensity and product attributes).
9In section 8, we introduce endogenous markups. This generates another channel for variations in revenue-based
productivity. More productive firms set higher markups, which raises their measured revenue-based productivity
relative to less productive firms.
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Firm Entry and Exit
There is a competitive fringe of potential firms that can enter the sector by paying a sunk entry cost
of fE units of the composite input. Potential entrants face uncertainty about their productivity
in the sector. Once the sunk entry cost is paid, a firm draws its productivity ϕ from a fixed
distribution g(ϕ), with cumulative distribution G(ϕ).
After observing its productivity, a firm decides whether to exit the sector or to produce. This
decision yields a survival cutoff productivity ϕ∗ at which a firm makes zero profits:
pi(ϕ∗) =
r(ϕ∗)
σ
− wf = B(ϕ∗)σ−1 − wf = 0. (3)
The relationship between profits and productivity is shown graphically in Figure 1. Firms
drawing a productivity ϕ < ϕ∗ would incur losses if they produced. Therefore these firms exit
immediately, receiving pi(ϕ) = 0, and cannot cover any portion of their sunk entry cost. Among
the active firms, a subset of them with pi(ϕ) > wfE make positive profits net of the sunk entry
cost. Free entry implies that in equilibrium, this expected measure of ex-ante profits (inclusive of
the entry cost) must be equal to zero:
∫ ∞
0
pi(ϕ)dG(ϕ) =
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
[
Bϕσ−1 − wf] dG(ϕ) = wfE . (4)
This framework captures a number of the features of micro data discussed above. Heterogeneity
in firm productivity generates the systematic differences in firm employment, revenue and profits
observed in micro data (see for example Bartelsman and Doms 2000). Selection into production
(only firms with productivity ϕ ≥ ϕ∗ produce) delivers the empirical regularity that exiting firms
are less productive than surviving firms (as in Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson 1989).
4 Closed Economy Equilibrium
General equilibrium can be characterized by the following variables for each sector: the survival
productivity cutoff ϕ∗j , the price wj and supply Lj of the composite input, the mass of entrants
MEj , and aggregate expenditure Xj . To determine this equilibrium vector, we use the model’s
recursive structure, in which the productivity cutoff ϕ∗j can be determined independently of the
other equilibrium variables.
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Figure 1: Closed Economy Equilibrium {ϕ∗, B/w}
Sectoral Equilibrium
Once again, we drop the sector j subscript to streamline notation, and measure all nominal variables
(prices, profits, revenues) relative to the unit cost w in that sector. The zero-profit condition (3)
and free entry (4) provide two equations involving only two endogenous variables: the productivity
cutoff ϕ∗ and market demand B/w. Combining these two conditions, we obtain a single equation
that determines the productivity cutoff:
fJ (ϕ∗) = fE , J (ϕ∗) =
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
[(
ϕ
ϕ∗
)σ−1
− 1
]
dG(ϕ). (5)
Since J(.) is monotonically decreasing with limϕ∗→0 J(ϕ∗) = ∞ and limϕ∗→∞ J(ϕ∗) = 0, the free
entry condition (5) identifies a unique equilibrium cutoff ϕ∗. Market demand is then B/w =
f (ϕ∗)1−σ. Using these two equilibrium variables, we can determine the distribution of all firm
performance measures (relative to the input cost w). Productivity ϕ will be distributed with
cumulative distribution function G(ϕ)/ [1−G(ϕ∗)], and the distribution of prices, profits, revenues,
output, and employment will be given by the following functions of firm productivity ϕ and market
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demand B/w:
p(ϕ)
w =
σ
σ−1
1
ϕ ,
pi(ϕ)
w =
B
wϕ
σ−1 − f,
r(ϕ)
w = σ
[
pi(ϕ)
w + f
]
,
q(ϕ) = r(ϕ)p(ϕ) ,
l(ϕ) = q(ϕ)ϕ + f.
CES preferences and monopolistic competition ensure that sector aggregates such as expenditures
and input supply impact neither firm selection ϕ∗ nor the distribution of any of the firm performance
measures. Those sector aggregates will only influence the mass of firms. Before deriving this
relationship between sector aggregates and the mass of firms, we describe some important properties
of the distribution of firm performance measures.
We start by noting that the free entry condition (4) pins down the average profit (and hence
the average revenue) of active firms:
p¯i
w
=
fE
1−G(ϕ∗) ,
r¯
w
= σ
( p¯i
w
+ f
)
.
Let ϕ˜ be the productivity of the firm earning those average profits and revenues. From the free
entry condition (4), we can derive ϕ˜ as a function of the cutoff productivity ϕ∗:
ϕ˜σ−1 =
∫ ∞
ϕ∗
ϕσ−1
dG(ϕ)
1−G (ϕ∗) .
ϕ˜ is a harmonic average of firm productivity ϕ, weighted by relative output shares q(ϕ)/q(ϕ˜). This
productivity average also references productivity for the aggregate sector consumption index Q
and the price index P in the following sense: A hypothetical monopolistic competition equilibrium
with M representative firms sharing a common productivity ϕ˜ would induce the same consumption
index Q = Mσ/(σ−1)q(ϕ˜) and price index P = M1/(1−σ)p(ϕ˜) as M heterogeneous firms with the
equilibrium distribution G(ϕ)/ [1−G (ϕ∗)]. We will also show that given the same input supply
L and expenditures X for the sector, the hypothetical equilibrium with representative firms would
also feature the same mass M of active firms as in our current setup with heterogeneous firms.
In this heterogeneous firm setup, the mass M of active firms represents the portion of the mass
ME of entrants that survive. This portion depends on the survival cutoff ϕ
∗: M = [1−G (ϕ∗)]ME .
The sector’s input supply L is used both for production by the M active firms, and to cover the
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entry cost fE incurred by all ME entrants. Since payments to inputs used for production must
equal the difference between aggregate sector revenues R and profit Π, we can write the factor
market equilibrium condition equating demand and supply for the sector’s composite input as:
L =
R−Π
w
+MEfE .
Note that the free entry condition ensures that aggregate profits exactly cover the aggregate entry
cost: Π = Mp¯i = wMEfE . Therefore, aggregate sector revenue is determined by the input supply:
R/w = L. In a closed economy this must also be equal to the sector’s expenditures X/w.
Since L = R/w = X/w affects neither firm selection (the cutoff ϕ∗) not average firm sales r¯/w,
changes in this measure of market size must be reflected one-for-one in the mass of both active
firms and entrants. This result is analogous to Krugman (1980), where firm size is also independent
of market size. In fact, a single-sector version of our model would yield the same sector aggregate
variables and firm averages (for the firm with productivity ϕ˜) as in Krugman’s (1980) model where
all firms share the same productivity level given by ϕ˜. (The key distinction with our heterogeneous
firms model is that the reference productivity level ϕ˜ is endogenously determined.) The result
that market size affects neither firm selection nor the distribution of firm size is very specific to
our assumption of CES preferences. In section 8, we analyze other preferences that feature a link
between market size and both firm selection and the distribution of firm performance measures
(size, price, markups, profit).
General Equilibrium
Now that we have characterized equilibrium in each sector j in terms of firm selection (ϕ∗j ), market
demand (Bj/wj), and the distribution of firm performance measures, we embed the sector in general
equilibrium. The simplest way to close the model in general equilibrium is to assume a single factor
of production (labor L¯) that is mobile across sectors and indexes the size of the economy. Labor
mobility ensures that the wage w is the same for all sectors j. If the homogenous numeraire good
is produced, we have wj = w = 1. Otherwise, we choose labor as the numeraire so that again
wj = w = 1.
With the zero-profit cutoff in each sector (ϕ∗j ) and the wage (w) already determined, the other
elements of the equilibrium vector follow immediately. Aggregate income follows from Y = wL¯ and
industry revenue and expenditure follow from Rj = Xj = βjY = βjwL¯. The mass of firms in each
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sector is
Mj =
Rj
r¯j
=
βjL¯
σ
[
fEj
1−G(ϕ∗j ) + fj
] .
The results on the efficiency of the market equilibrium from Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) hold
in this setting with heterogeneous firms: conditional on an allocation of labor to sector j, the
market allocation is constrained efficient. In other words, a social planner using the same entry
technology characterized by Gj(.) and fEj would choose the same mass of entrants MEj and the
same distribution of quantities produced qj(ϕ) as a function of productivity, including the same
productivity cutoff ϕ∗j and mass of producing firms Mj with positive quantities.
10 In this multi-
sector setting, the allocation of labor across sectors will not be efficient due to differences in markups
across sectors (the labor allocation in high markup, low elasticity sectors will be inefficiently low).
The single sector version of the model is a special case in which there are no variations in markups
and the market equilibrium is therefore efficient.
5 Open Economy with Trade Costs
In the closed economy, sector aggregates such as spending Xj and input supply Lj have no effect
on firm selection (the cutoff ϕ∗j ) and the distribution of firm performance measures within the
sector. Since opening the closed economy to costless international trade is the same as increasing
aggregate spending and input supply, such a change will have no impact on those firm-level variables.
Although this result for costless trade provides a useful benchmark, a large empirical literature finds
evidence of substantial trade costs.11 In this section, we characterize the open economy equilibrium
in the presence of costly trade, which yields sharply different predictions for the effects of trade
liberalization. We focus on trade costs that use real resources, although we briefly discuss trade
policies such as tariffs, which raise revenue that must be taken into account in welfare calculations.
The world economy consists of a number of countries indexed by i = 1, . . . , N . Preferences
are identical across countries and given by (1). We assume that each country is endowed with a
single homogeneous factor of production (labor) that is in inelastic supply L¯i and is mobile across
sectors.12 We allow countries to differ in terms of their aggregate labor supply, the productivity
distributions in each of the differentiated sectors, and their bilateral trade costs. The open economy
10See Dhingra and Morrow (2012) for a formal analysis of the efficiency of the equilibrium.
11See for example the survey by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004).
12In a later section, we explore the implications of introducing multiple factors of production and Heckscher-Ohlin
comparative advantage in the open economy equilibrium.
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equilibrium can be referenced by a zero-profit cutoff for serving each market n from each country
i in each sector j (ϕ∗nij), a wage for each country (wi), a mass of entrants for each country and
sector (MEij), and industry expenditure for each country and sector (Xij).
For much of our analysis, we assume that the additional homogeneous good (in sector j = 0) is
produced in all countries. This good is produced with a unit labor requirement, is costlessly traded,
and is chosen as our numeraire.13 In such an incomplete specialization equilibrium, wi = w = 1 for
all countries i. Combining this result with our assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences, consumer
expenditure on each sector j in each country i is determined by parameters alone: Xij = βjLi. In
some of our analysis below, we consider the case of no outside sector, in which case each country’s
wage is determined by the equality between its income and world expenditure on its goods.
Firm Behavior
As in the closed economy, we focus on equilibrium in a given sector and drop the sector subscript.
Firm heterogeneity takes the same form in each country. After paying the sunk entry cost in
country i (fEi), a firm draws its productivity ϕ from the cumulative distribution Gi(ϕ). To serve
market n, firms must incur a fixed cost of fni units of labor in country i and an iceberg variable
trade cost such that τni > 1 units must be shipped from country i for one unit to arrive in country
n.14 We assume that all production costs (including the fixed exporting costs) are incurred in terms
of source country labor. The fixed exporting cost captures “market access” costs (e.g. advertising,
distribution, and conforming to foreign regulations) that do not vary with exporter scale. With
CES preferences, this fixed cost is needed to generate selection into export markets such that only
the most productive firms export. Absent this fixed export cost all firms would export.
We denote the fixed costs of serving the domestic market by fii, which includes both “market
access” costs and fixed production costs (whereas the export cost fni for n 6= i incorporates only
the market access cost). Thus, the combined domestic cost fii need not be lower than the export
cost fni (n 6= i), even if the market access component for the domestic market is always lower than
its export market counterpart. When incorporating the fixed production cost into the domestic
cost, we are anticipating an equilibrium where all firms serve their domestic market and only a
subset of more productive firms export, as in the empirical literature discussed above.15 Finally,
13The assumption that the homogeneous good is produced in all countries will be satisfied if its consumption share
and the countries’ labor endowments are large enough.
14We focus on exporting as the mode for serving foreign markets. For reviews of the literature on Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI), see Antra`s and Yeaple (2012) and Helpman (2006).
15With zero domestic market access costs, no firm exports without serving the domestic market, because the fixed
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we assume lower variable trade costs for the domestic market, τii ≤ τni, and set τii = 1 and τni ≥ 1
without loss of generality.
Much of the literature on firm heterogeneity and trade takes these fixed and variable trade costs
as exogenously given, although in a later section we discuss the market penetration technology of
Arkolakis (2010), in which the fixed costs of serving a market depend on the endogenous fraction
of consumers that firms choose to serve. The implications of different microfoundations for trade
costs in models of firm heterogeneity remain under explored, including whether trade costs are
sunk, fixed or variable (e.g. Das et al. 2007), whether variable trade costs are ad valorem versus
per unit (e.g. Hummels and Skiba 2004 and Irarrazabal et al. 2012), the role of intermediaries (e.g.
Ahn et al. 2010, Antra`s and Costinot 2011 and Bernard et al. 2010b), and the role of transport
costs versus information, advertising, marketing and other trade costs (e.g. Allen 2012).
If a firm with productivity ϕ supplies market n from country i, the first-order condition for
profit maximization again implies that its equilibrium price is a constant mark-up over its delivered
marginal cost in that destination:
pni (ϕ) =
σ
σ − 1
τni
ϕ
.
Revenue and profit earned from sales to that destination are:
rni (ϕ) = Anpni(ϕ)
1−σ, An = XnP σ−1n ,
pini (ϕ) = Bnτ
1−σ
ni ϕ
σ−1 − fni, Bn = (σ − 1)
σ−1
σσ
An.
As in the closed economy, An and Bn are proportional indices of market demand in country n; they
are functions of sector spending Xn and the CES price index Pn. Since all firms serve the domestic
market, we account for the fixed production cost in “domestic” profit piii(ϕ).
cost of production has to be incurred irrespective of whether the domestic market is served and CES preferences
imply positive variable profits in the domestic market. In contrast, with positive domestic market access costs, it can
be profitable in principle for firms to export but not serve the domestic market (see, for example, Lu 2011). Using
French export data by firm and destination market, Eaton et al. (2011) find that less than one percent of French
firms export without serving the domestic market.
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Firm Market Entry and Exit
The presence of fixed market access costs implies that there is a zero-profit cutoff for each pair of
source country and destination market:
pini(ϕ
∗
ni) = 0,
rni(ϕ
∗
ni)
σ
= fni ⇐⇒ Bn (τni)1−σ (ϕ∗ni)σ−1 = fni, (6)
such that firms from country i with productivity ϕ < ϕ∗ni do not sell in market n and receive
rni(ϕ) = pini(ϕ) = 0. Total firm revenue and profit (across destinations) are ri(ϕ) =
∑
n rni(ϕ)
and pii(ϕ) =
∑
n pini(ϕ). We require restrictions on parameter values that generate selection into
export markets and hence ϕ∗ii ≤ ϕ∗ni for all n 6= i.
Just like the closed economy, the free entry condition for country i equates an entrant’s ex-ante
expected profits with the sunk entry cost:
∫ ∞
0
pii(ϕ)dGi(ϕ) =
∑
n
∫ ∞
ϕ∗ni
[
Bnτ
1−σ
ni ϕ
σ−1 − fni
]
dGi(ϕ) = fEi. (7)
The zero-profit cutoff (6) and free entry conditions (7) jointly determine all the cutoffs ϕ∗ni and
market demand levels Bn. The domestic cutoffs ϕ
∗
nn and market demands Bn can be solved
separately using (6) to rewrite the free entry condition (7) as
∑
n
fniJi (ϕ
∗
ni) = fEi, (8)
where we use the same definition for Ji(ϕ
∗) from (5). We can then use the cutoff condition (6)
again to write the cutoffs ϕ∗ni as either a function of market demands, ϕ
∗
ni = (fni/Bn)
1/(σ−1) τni, or
as a function of the domestic cutoffs, ϕ∗ni = (fni/fnn)
1/(σ−1) τniϕ∗nn. Using the former, (8) delivers
N equations for the market demands Bn; while the latter delivers N equations for the domestic
cutoffs ϕ∗nn.
The open economy model has a recursive structure that is similar to the closed economy model:
The cutoffs and market demands and hence the distribution of all firm performance measures
(prices, quantities, sales, profits in all destinations) are independent of the sector aggregates such
as sector spending X and sector labor supply L. Thus, only the mass of firms responds to the size
of the sectors. We show how the exogenous sector spending X = βL¯ can be used to solve for these
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quantities.
Mass of Firms and Price Index
Given MEi entrants in country i, a subset Mni = [1−Gi(ϕ∗ni)]MEi of these firms sells to destination
n. Product variety in that destination then is given by the total mass of sellers Mn =
∑
nMni.
The price index Pn in that destination is the CES aggregate of the prices of all these goods:
P 1−σn =
∑
i
{
Mni
∫ ∞
ϕ∗ni
pni(ϕ)
1−σ dGi(ϕ)
1−Gi(ϕ∗ni)
}
=
(
σ
σ − 1
)1−σ∑
i
{
MEiτ
1−σ
ni
∫ ∞
ϕ∗ni
ϕσ−1dGi(ϕ)
}
.
(9)
This price index in n is also related to market demand there:
Bn =
(σ − 1)σ−1
σσ
XnP
σ−1
n ⇐⇒ P 1−σn =
(σ − 1)σ−1
σσ
XnB
−1
n . (10)
Using (9) and (10), we can solve out the price index and obtain
Xn
σBn
=
∑
i
MEiτ
1−σ
ni
∫ ∞
ϕ∗ni
ϕσ−1dGi(ϕ), (11)
which yields a system of N equations that determines the N entry variables MEi. (Recall that we
have already solved out the left-hand side of those equations.) Using (10) and (6), we can express
the price index in destination n as a function of the domestic cutoff only:
Pn =
σ
σ − 1
(
fnnσ
βL¯n
)1/(σ−1) 1
ϕ∗nn
. (12)
Welfare
This price index summarizes the contribution of each sector to overall welfare. The Cobb-Douglas
aggregation of sector-level consumption into utility in (1) implies that welfare per worker in country
n (with income wn = 1) is:
Un =
J∏
j=0
P
−βj
nj , (13)
where the sectoral price index (12) depends solely on the sectoral productivity cutoff ϕ∗nnj . There-
fore, although welfare depends on both the range of varieties available for consumption and their
prices (these are the components that enter into the definition of each sector’s CES price index in
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(9)), the domestic productivity cutoffs in each sector are sufficient statistics for welfare. Changes in
trade costs will lead to changes in the ranges of imported and domestically produced varieties and
their prices. All of these changes have an impact on welfare but their joint impact is summarized
by the change in the domestic productivity cutoff. Similarly, the impact of changes in the number
of countries or their size on welfare is also summarized by the change in the domestic productivity
cutoff.16
Symmetric Trade and Production Costs
To provide further intuition for mechanisms in the model, we consider the special case of symmetric
trade and production costs (across countries):
τni = τ and fni = fX ∀n 6= i,
fii = f, and fEi = fE and Gi (·) = G (·) ∀i.
The only difference across countries is country size, indexed by the aggregate (across sectors)
labor endowment L¯i. In this special symmetric case, solving the free entry conditions (8) for the
market demands Bn using ϕ
∗
ni = (fX/Bn)
1/(σ−1) τ yields a common market demand Bn = B for
all countries. This, in turn, implies that all countries have the same domestic cutoff ϕ∗ii = ϕ
∗ and
that there is a single export cutoff ϕ∗ni = ϕ
∗
X for n 6= i. These cutoffs are the solutions to the new
zero-profit cutoff conditions:
piD(ϕ
∗) = B (ϕ∗)σ−1 − f = 0, (14)
piX(ϕ
∗
X) = Bτ
1−σ (ϕ∗X)
σ−1 − fX = 0, (15)
and the free entry condition then takes the following form:
fJ (ϕ∗) + fX(N − 1)J (ϕ∗X) = fE . (16)
These three conditions (14)-(16) jointly determine the two symmetric cutoffs ϕ∗ and ϕ∗X and the
symmetric market demand B. Note that the variable trade cost τ does not enter the free entry
condition (16). Therefore changes in τ necessarily shift the productivity cutoffs ϕ∗ and ϕ∗X in
16While this expression for welfare in terms of the domestic productivity cutoff holds for a general productivity
distribution, it does not extend to observable trade aggregates such as the trade share of a country with itself.
Stronger assumptions parameterizing the productivity distribution and eliminating factor movements across sectors
are needed to deliver that result, as we discuss in Section 6.
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opposite directions.
Under symmetry, the domestic and exporting zero-profit cutoff conditions (14) and (15) imply
that the exporting cutoff is a constant proportion of the domestic cutoff:
ϕ∗X = τ
(
fX
f
) 1
σ−1
ϕ∗.
Thus selection into export markets (ϕ∗X > ϕ
∗) requires strictly positive fixed exporting costs and
sufficiently high values of both fixed and variable trade costs: τσ−1fX > f .
The relationship between profits and productivity is shown graphically in Figure 2. Firms
drawing a low productivity ϕ < ϕ∗ would incur losses if they produced and hence exit immedi-
ately. Firms drawing an intermediate productivity ϕ ∈ [ϕ∗, ϕ∗X) only serve their domestic market,
which generates sufficient revenue to cover fixed costs (piD (ϕ) ≥ 0). Only firms drawing a high
productivity ϕ ≥ ϕ∗X can generate sufficient revenue to cover fixed costs in both the domestic
market and every export market. (Recall that each export market has the same level of market
demand B; therefore an exporter with productivity ϕ earns the same export profits piX(ϕ) in each
destination.) Export market profits (in each destination) increase less steeply with firm produc-
tivity than domestic profits as a result of variable trade costs. The slope of total firm profits
pi(ϕ) = piD(ϕ) + (N − 1)piX(ϕ) increases from B to B
(
1 + τ1−σ (N − 1)) at the export cutoff ϕ∗X ,
above which higher productivity generates profits from sales to the domestic market and all export
markets. While firm profits are continuous in productivity, firm revenue jumps discretely at the
export cutoff due to the fixed exporting costs. The model therefore captures empirical findings that
exporters are not only more productive than non-exporters but also larger in terms of revenue and
employment (e.g. Bernard and Jensen 1995, 1999).
Multilateral Trade Liberalization
The impact of multilateral trade liberalization is seen most clearly in the transition between the
closed economy and the open economy with symmetric trade and production costs. Comparing the
free entry conditions in the open and closed economies (16) and (5) respectively, and noting that
J(.) is decreasing, we see that the productivity cutoff in each sector must be strictly higher in the
open economy than in the closed economy. From welfare (13), this increase in the zero-profit cutoff
productivity in each sector is sufficient to establish welfare gains from trade.
The effect of opening to trade is illustrated in Figure 3. When the economy opens up to trade,
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Figure 2: Open Economy Symmetric Countries
the domestic market demand changes from its autarky level BA to B (symmetric across countries).
This new market demand cannot be higher than its autarky level, as this would imply that the
total profit curve pi(ϕ) in the open economy is everywhere above the total profit curve piA(ϕ) in
autarky. This would imply a rise in profits for all firms (at all productivity levels) and violates
the free entry condition. Therefore, the new market demand B must be strictly below BA. For
the free entry condition to hold in both the closed and open economy equilibria, the total profit
curves pi(ϕ) and piA(ϕ) must intersect. This implies that the combined domestic plus export market
demand B + (N − 1)Bτ1−σ must be strictly higher than the autarky demand level BA. Thus, the
market demands must satisfy B < BA < B + (N − 1)Bτ1−σ. The first inequality implies that
all firms experience a reduction in domestic sales r(ϕ) = σBϕσ−1 (and hence a contraction in
total sales for non-exporters); the second inequality implies that exporters more than make-up for
their contraction in domestic sales with export sales and hence experience an increase in total sales
r(ϕ) = σ[B + (N − 1)Bτ1−σ]ϕσ−1.17
Opening to trade therefore induces a within-industry reallocation of resources between firms.
The least productive firms exit with the rise in the domestic cutoff ϕ∗, the firms with intermediate
productivity levels below the export cutoff ϕ∗X contract, while the most productivity firms with
productivity above the export cutoff ϕ∗X expand. Each of these responses reallocates resources
17Variable profits are proportional to revenues for all firms, but total profits also depend on fixed costs. Total profits
move in the same direction as revenues for all firms, except for a subset of the least productive exporters. Although
their total revenues increase, they experience a drop in total profit due to the additional fixed cost of exporting.
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Figure 3: Open Economy Symmetric Countries
towards higher productivity firms generating an increase in average industry productivity.18
The free entry condition implies that ex-ante expected profits in both the open and closed
economies are equal to the entry cost fE . Ex-post the average profits of surviving firms p¯i =
fE/[1 − G(ϕ∗)] will be higher in the open economy due to the higher survival cutoff ϕ∗. (Recall
that this average profit level will not depend on country size.) In both the open and closed economy,
average total revenue per firm will be r¯ = σ(p¯i + f¯), where f¯ is the average (post-entry) fixed cost
per firm. In the closed economy, f¯ = f (the same overhead production cost paid by all firms). In
the open economy f¯ = f + fX [1−G(ϕ∗X)]/ [1−G(ϕ∗)] , which adds the fixed export cost weighted
by the proportion of exporting firms. Thus, we see that average firm revenue r¯ will be higher in
the open economy than the closed economy.
As in the closed economy, differences in country size will be reflected in the mass of entrants
in a country. However, in the open economy with trade costs, the relationship between country
size and entrants (and hence the mass of producing firms) will no longer be proportional. There
will be a home market effect for entry, which responds more than proportionately to increases in
country size: Solving the system of equations (11) under our symmetry assumptions reveals that
MEi/MEi′ > L¯i/L¯i′ for any two countries i and i
′.19 Differences in the mass of producing firms
18These reallocations of revenue and profits across firms following trade liberalization can in turn have implications
for the political economy of trade protection, as in Bombardini (2008) and Do and Levchenko (2009).
19This assumes that there is some available labor in the homogeneous good sector that can be moved to the
differentiated good sectors. This would not be possible in the single-sector version of our model. Recall that we are
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Mii = [1−G (ϕ∗)]MEi will be proportional to entry since all countries have the same survival
cutoff under our symmetry assumptions. These differences in the mass of entrants and producing
firms across countries also imply disproportionate differences in the allocation of labor to the
differentiated sectors across countries. Recall that the free entry condition requires that aggregate
sector payments to cover the entry cost, MEifE , are equal to aggregate sector profits Πi (this
property must hold for both the open and closed economies). Thus, aggregate sector labor supply
Li must be equal to aggregate sector revenue Ri:
20
Li = Ri = Miir¯,
where average revenue is symmetric across countries. Therefore the disproportionate response of
entry MEi and producing firms Mii is also reflected in a disproportionate response of labor supply
Li in larger countries. Since sector expenditures Xi = βL¯i are proportional to country size, this
implies that larger countries run a trade surplus in the differentiated good sectors.
In a single-sector version of our model, trade must be balanced, which implies that labor supply
Li, entry MEi, and producing firms Mii are proportional to country size L¯i:
Li
Li′
=
MEi
MEi′
=
Mii
Mi′i′
=
L¯i
L¯i′
.
In this case, opening to trade does not affect the labor supply to the single sector, and would
then induce a reduction in the mass of producing firms Mii = Li/r¯ in every country since average
revenues are larger in the open economy. Even in this case, the response of product variety in
country i, Mi =
∑
nMni is ambiguous due to the availability of imported varieties. However, even
if the mass of varieties available for domestic consumption falls, there are necessarily welfare gains
from trade, because the zero profit cutoff productivity rises and is a sufficient statistic for welfare
in (13).21
The efficiency properties of the symmetric country open economy equilibrium are the same as
in the closed economy: Conditional on the allocation of labor across sectors, a world social planner
assuming that differences in country size are not so large as to induce specialization away from the homogeneous
sector in large countries.
20Recall that we assume that all production costs, including the fixed exporting costs fX , are incurred in terms of
labor in the source country.
21Note the contrast with Krugman (1979), in which the opening of trade increases firm size and reduces the
mass of domestically-produced varieties, but increases the mass of varieties available for domestic consumption. The
underlying mechanism is also quite different: in Krugman (1979) firms are homogeneous and the increase in firm size
occurs as a result of a variable elasticity of substitution.
23
faced with the same entry and export technology (where the trade costs use up real resources) would
choose the same distribution of quantities (as a function of firm productivity) and the same mass of
producing firms as in the market equilibrium.22 If trade costs take the form of policy interventions
that do not use up real resources and instead raise revenue (e.g. tariffs), national social planners
can have an incentive to introduce trade policies to manipulate the terms of trade, as in Demidova
and Rodriguez-Clare (2009). In a multi-sector setting with different elasticities of substitution,
the allocation of labor across sectors is not efficient, providing a further potential rationale for
interventionist trade policies to increase the labor allocation in high markup, low elasticity sectors.
Although for simplicity we have concentrated on opening the closed economies to trade, anal-
ogous results hold for further multilateral trade liberalization in the open economy equilibrium,
where this liberalization again takes the form of an expansion in real trading opportunities. Such
multilateral trade liberalization includes (i) an increase in the number of trading partners (N − 1),
(ii) a decrease in variable trade costs (τ) and (iii) a decrease in fixed exporting costs (fX). In
each case, increased trade openness raises the zero-profit cutoff productivity and induces exit by
the least productive firms, market share reallocations from less to more productive firms, and an
increase in welfare.
Asymmetric Trade Liberalization
While the previous two sections have focused on symmetric trade and production costs, we now
examine asymmetric import or export liberalization, where this liberalization again involves a
change in the real resource costs of trade. Following Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2011), we
consider two asymmetric countries (countries 1 and 2) with a single differentiated sector and no
outside sector. In this case, the relative wage between the two countries is no longer fixed and is
determined by the balanced trade condition. We therefore re-introduce the wage w1 and choose
labor in country 2 as the numeraire, so w2 = 1. Re-introducing wages does not change the form
of the free entry condition (8), which yields 2 conditions relating the domestic cutoff to the export
cutoff for each country. With a slight abuse of notation, we use those conditions to write the
domestic cutoffs as functions of the export cutoffs: ϕ∗22 = ϕ∗22(ϕ∗12) and ϕ∗11 = ϕ∗11(ϕ∗21).23 The
22See Dhingra and Morrow (2012) for a formal analysis.
23We continue with our notation choice that the first subscript denotes the country of consumption and the second
subscript the country of production. The notation in Demidova and Rodriguez-Clare (2011) reverses the order of the
subscripts.
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cutoff profit conditions yield:
ϕ∗21 = τ21
(
f21
f22
)1/(σ−1)
(w1)
σ/(σ−1) ϕ∗22, (17)
ϕ∗12 = τ12
(
f12
f11
)1/(σ−1)
(w1)
−σ/(σ−1) ϕ∗11.
These conditions implicitly define the export cutoffs as functions of the wage w1 and the domestic
cutoff in the other country: ϕ∗21 ≡ h21(w1, ϕ∗22) and ϕ∗12 ≡ h12(w1, ϕ∗11). Combining all these
conditions together yields a “competitiveness” condition for the export cutoff in country 1 as a
function of the wage w1:
ϕ∗21 = h21
(
w1, ϕ
∗
22(ϕ
∗
12)
)
= h21
(
w1, ϕ
∗
22
(
h12
(
w1, ϕ
∗
11(ϕ
∗
21)
)))
(18)
This competitiveness condition defines an increasing relationship in (w1, ϕ
∗
21) space, as shown in
Figure 4. Intuitively, a higher wage reduces a country’s competitiveness and implies a higher cutoff
productivity for exporting.
The “trade balance” condition is derived from labor market clearing, free entry, the zero-profit
productivity cutoff conditions and the requirement that trade is balanced:
ME1(w1, ϕ
∗
21)w1f21 [J1 (ϕ
∗
21) + 1−G1 (ϕ∗21)]
= ME2(w1, ϕ
∗
21)f12
[
J2
(
h12
(
w1, ϕ
∗
11 (ϕ
∗
21)
))
+ 1−G2
(
h12
(
h12
(
w1, ϕ
∗
11 (ϕ
∗
21)
)))]
,
(19)
which defines a decreasing relationship in (w1, ϕ
∗
21) space, as also shown in Figure 4. Intuitively, a
higher productivity cutoff for exporting reduces total exports, which induces a trade deficit, and
hence requires a reduction in the wage to increase competitiveness and eliminate the trade deficit.
Note that since the trade balance condition (19) incorporates the competitiveness condition (18)
care must be undertaken in the interpretation of these two relationships.
The effects of asymmetric trade liberalizations can be characterized most sharply for the case of
a small open economy. In the monopolistically competitive environment considered here, country
1 is assumed to be a small open economy if (i) the zero-profit productivity cutoff in country 2 is
unaffected by home variables, (ii) the mass of firms in country 2 is unaffected by home variables, (iii)
total expenditure and the price index in country 2 are unaffected by home variables. Nonetheless,
the export productivity cutoff in country 2 and the measure of exporters from foreign to home are
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endogenous and depend on trade costs.
Under these small open economy assumptions, ϕ∗22 is exogenous with respect to country 1
variables and the trade cost between the two countries. In these circumstances, a unilateral trade
liberalization by country 1 (a fall in variable trade costs (τ12) and/or fixed exporting costs f12)
leaves the competitiveness condition unchanged but shifts the trade balance condition inwards. As
a result, w1 and ϕ
∗
21 fall, which implies a rise in ϕ
∗
11 (from the free entry condition). Since the
domestic productivity cutoff is a sufficient statistic for welfare in (13), this in turn implies a rise
in country 1’s welfare. Intuitively, the unilateral domestic trade liberalization reduces the price
of foreign goods relative to domestic goods, and requires a fall in the domestic wage to restore
the trade balance. This fall in the domestic wage increases export market profits, which induces
increased entry and hence tougher selection on the domestic market.
In contrast, a unilateral reduction in variable trade costs by country 2 (a fall in τ21) shifts the
competitiveness condition outwards but leaves the trade balance condition unchanged. As a result,
w1 rises and ϕ
∗
21 again falls, which implies a rise in ϕ
∗
11. Thus, once again, welfare in country 1
rises. Intuitively, the fall in foreign variable trade costs increases domestic export market profits,
which induces increased entry and tougher selection on the domestic market. The domestic wage
rises to restore the trade balance. Reductions in the fixed costs of exporting to country 2 (f21)
have more subtle effects, because they shift both the competitiveness and trade balance curves.
The key takeaway from this analysis without an outside sector is that reductions in variable
trade costs on either exports or imports raise welfare. In contrast, in the presence of an outside
sector, reductions in variable trade costs on imports can be welfare reducing. This negative welfare
impact is driven by the home market effect, which relocates production toward the higher trade
cost country. Firms can access this market without incurring trade costs and take advantage of the
lower variable trade costs on imports in the liberalizing country (see for example Krugman 1980
and Venables 1987).
6 Quantitative Predictions
In order to derive quantitative predictions for trade and welfare, we follow a large part of the
literature and assume a Pareto productivity distribution, as in Helpman et al. (2004), Chaney
(2008) and Arkolakis et al. (2008, 2012). Besides providing a good fit to the observed firm size
distribution (see e.g. Axtell 2001), this assumption yields closed form solutions for the productivity
cutoffs and other endogenous variables of the model. For much of the analysis, we maintain our
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Figure 4: Competitiveness and Trade Balance Conditions
assumption of a composite input supply Lj for each sector j with a unit cost wj that can vary across
sectors. When we solve for factor prices, we restrict our analysis to the case of homogeneous labor
with a common wage across sectors. To determine this wage, we dispense with the assumption of
an outside sector, and use the equality between country income and expenditure on goods produced
in that country.
Pareto Distribution
We now assume that firm productivity ϕ is drawn from a Pareto distribution so that
g(ϕ) = kϕkminϕ
−(k+1), G(ϕ) = 1−
(
ϕmin
ϕ
)k
,
where ϕmin > 0 is the lower bound of the support and the shape parameter k indexes dispersion
(lower values of k are associated with greater productivity dispersion).24
A key feature of a Pareto distributed random variable is that it retains the same distribution
and shape parameter k whenever it is truncated from below. Therefore the ex post distribution of
firm productivity conditional on survival also has a Pareto distribution. Another key feature of a
24While a common shape parameter k for all countries is an important simplifying assumption, it is straightforward
to accommodate cross-country differences in technology in the form of different lower bounds for the support of the
productivity distribution ϕmin. For an analysis of the implications of cross-country differences in technology in a
heterogeneous firm model with an outside sector, see Demidova (2008).
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Pareto distributed random variable is that power functions of this random variable are themselves
Pareto distributed (but with a different shape parameter). Therefore firm size and variable profits
are also Pareto distributed with shape parameter k/ (σ − 1), where we require k > σ−1 for average
firm size to be finite.25
With Pareto distributed productivity, J(ϕ∗) is a simple power function of the productivity
cutoff ϕ∗.26 From this power function, we obtain the following closed form solutions for the survival
productivity cutoff in the closed economy:
(ϕ∗)k =
σ − 1
k − (σ − 1)
f
fE
ϕkmin,
and in the symmetric country open economy:
(ϕ∗)k =
σ − 1
k − (σ − 1)
f + (N − 1) τ−k
(
fX
f
) −k
σ−1
fX
fE
ϕkmin.
Gravity
When firm productivity and hence firm exports to any destination are distributed Pareto, we obtain
some very sharp predictions for bilateral trade flows (at the aggregate sector level). Before imposing
this distributional assumption, we can write aggregate sector exports from i to n as:
Xni = MEi
∫ ∞
ϕ∗ni
rni(ϕ)dG(ϕ)
= MEi
∫ ∞
ϕ∗ni
(
ϕ
ϕ∗ni
)σ−1
σwifnidG(ϕ)
= MEiσwifni [J(ϕ
∗
ni) + 1−G(ϕ∗ni)]
25The requirement that k > σ − 1 is needed given that the support for the Pareto distribution is unbounded from
above and the assumption of a continuum of firms. If either of these conditions are relaxed (finite number of firms or a
truncated Pareto distribution), then this condition need not be imposed (empirical estimates of the shape parameter
k/(σ − 1) for the distribution of firm size are below one for some sectors).
26In particular, we have:
J(ϕ∗) =
σ − 1
k − (σ − 1)
(
ϕmin
ϕ∗
)k
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Using the closed form solution for J(.) under Pareto productivity, we can then decompose bilateral
aggregate trade into an extensive (mass of exporters) and intensive (average firm exports) margin:
Xni = MEi
(
ϕmin
ϕ∗ni
)k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
mass of exporters
wifni
σk
k − σ + 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
average firm exports
. (20)
Given this distributional assumption, we see that average firm exports are independent of variable
trade costs, so that higher variable trade costs reduce bilateral trade solely through the extensive
margin of the mass of exporting firms. On one hand, higher variable trade costs reduce firm-level
exports for all firms; this reduces average exports per firm. On the other hand, higher variable
trade costs also induce low productivity firms to exit the export market; this raises average exports
per firm through a composition effect (lower productivity firms have lower exports). With a Pareto
productivity distribution these two effects exactly offset one another, so as to leave average firm
exports (conditional on exporting) independent of variable trade costs.27 In contrast, higher fixed
costs of exporting (fni) increase the exporting productivity cutoff (ϕ
∗
ni), which reduces the mass of
exporting firms and increases average exports conditional on exporting.
This distributional assumption also allows us to write the sector-level bilateral trade flows as
a gravity equation that has a very similar structure to gravity equations derived from a variety
of other models of trade.28 Without imposing balanced trade, we can write industry revenue
Ri =
∑N
n=1Xni and use the export productivity cutoff condition (6) to re-write bilateral exports
from country i to market n in sector j (20) as:
Xni =
Ri
Ξi
(
Xn
P 1−σn
)k/(σ−1)
τ−kni f
1−k/(σ−1)
ni , (21)
Ξi =
∑
n
(
Xn
P 1−σn
)k/(σ−1)
τ−kni f
1−k/(σ−1)
ni .
This functional form is very similar to the standard CES gravity equation without firm heterogeneity
in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2002). Comparing the two expressions, a number of differences are
apparent. First, variable trade costs affect aggregate trade flows through both the intensive margin
(exports of a given firm) and the extensive margin (the number of exporting firms). However, the
exponent on variable trade costs τni is the Pareto shape parameter k rather than the elasticity of
27Note the parallel with Eaton and Kortum (2002), in which higher variable trade costs reduce bilateral exports
solely through an extensive margin of the fraction of goods exported.
28For further discussion of the gravity equation literature, see the Head and Mayer (2012) chapter in this handbook.
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substitution between varieties, which reflects the invariance of average firm exports with respect
to variable trade costs discussed above. Second, fixed exporting costs fni only affect aggregate
trade flows through the extensive margin of the number of exporting firms, and enter with an
exponent that depends on both the Pareto shape parameter and the elasticity of substitution.
Third, the importer fixed effect in the standard CES formulation (Xn/P
1−σ
n ) is amplified under
firm heterogeneity by k/(σ − 1) > 1, which captures the effect of market demand on the extensive
margin of exporting firms. Fourth, the exporter fixed effect is the same as in the standard CES
formulation (Ri/Ξi). This fixed effect combines an exporter’s industry revenue (Ri) with its market
potential (Ξi), where market potential is defined as in Redding and Venables (2004) as the trade
cost weighted sum of demand in all markets.
A key implication of the gravity equation (21) is that bilateral trade between countries i and n
depends on both bilateral trade costs {τni, fni} and trade costs with all the other partners of each
country (“multilateral resistance” as captured in Pn and Ξi). This role for multilateral resistance
can be further illustrated by solving explicitly for the price indices (Pn), which depend on the mass
of entrants (MEi) across countries. In general, the mass of entrants in country i will depend on both
the input supply Li to the sector as well as the cutoffs ϕ
∗
ni to all destinations n, which determine
the allocation of inputs between entry and production. However, under Pareto productivity, the
dependence of entry on the cutoffs is eliminated and entry only depends on the input supply to the
sector (see appendix for proof):29
MEi =
(σ − 1)
kσ
Li
fEi
. (22)
This allows us to write the price index in country n as a function of its own expenditure as well as
the input supply and unit cost in all countries:30
P−kn =
[∑
v (Lv/fEv)ϕ
k
minτ
−k
nv w
−(kσ/(σ−1)−1)
v (fnv)
1−k/(σ−1)
]
(Xn)
−(1−k/(σ−1))
(
σ
σ−1
)−k
σ−k/(σ−1) σ−1k−σ+1 .
We can then solve out this price index from the bilateral gravity equation (21) to obtain a trade
29Instead of using free entry to determine the mass of entrants, Chaney (2008) assumes an exogenous mass of
entrants proportional to the input supply Li. In this case, the marginal entrant makes zero profits, which implies
that there are positive expected profits that need to be taken into account in welfare calculations. As apparent from
(22), under the assumption of a Pareto productivity distribution, the mass of entrants is proportional to the input
supply Li even under free entry.
30Note that the exponent on unit cost differs from the exponent on variable trade costs because of our assumption
that fixed exporting costs are incurred in the source country.
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share that depends only on unit costs (wi) and input supplies (Li):
λni ≡ Xni
Xn
=
(Li/fEi) τ
−k
ni w
−(kσ/(σ−1)−1)
i f
1−k/(σ−1)
ni∑
v (Lv/fEv) τ
−k
nv w
−(kσ/(σ−1)−1)
v f
1−k/(σ−1)
nv
. (23)
The trade share (23) takes the familiar gravity equation form, as in Eaton and Kortum (2002).31
The elasticity of trade with respect to variable trade costs again depends on the Pareto shape
parameter (k) and there is a unit elasticity on importer expenditure (Xn) for given sectoral input
allocations (Li) and unit costs (wi) in all countries. One key difference from Eaton and Kortum
(2002) is that the trade share depends directly on the input allocation (Li), which reflects the
presence of an endogenous measure of firm varieties compared to a fixed range of goods.
Wages and Welfare
We now turn to the general equilibrium across sectors and investigate its welfare properties. To
close our model, we again assume that labor is homogeneous, with a fixed supply L¯i in each
country. We dispense with the assumption of an outside sector so that j = 1, . . . , J and all sectors
are differentiated. Sectoral spending is given by βjwnL¯n, and the country wages (common across
sectors j) are determined by the N balanced trade conditions for each country:
wiL¯i =
J∑
j=1
N∑
n=1
λnijβjwnL¯n,
where the trade shares λnij for each sector are determined by (23).
The assumption of Pareto productivity has some strong implications for the functional form
of the welfare gains from trade, as analyzed in Arkolakis et al. (2012a). Welfare per worker
(in country n) takes the same form as in (13), except that wages are no longer unitary: Un =
wn/
(∏J
j=1 P
βj
nj
)
=
∏J
j=1 (Pnj/wn)
−βj . The price index for sector j in country n, in turn, can be
written as a function of the domestic productivity cutoff in that sector as shown in (12):
Pnj =
σj
σj − 1
(
fnnjσj
βjL¯n
)1/(σj−1) wn
ϕ∗nnj
. (24)
Under the assumption of Pareto productivity, we can write the domestic cutoff in each sector ϕ∗nnj
31This trade share (23) under Pareto productivity can also be used to show that a sufficient condition for the mass
of varieties available for domestic consumption to fall following the opening of trade is wifni > wnfnn for n 6= i, as
analyzed in Baldwin and Forslid (2010).
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as a function of country n’s domestic trade share λnnj ≡ Xnnj/βjwnL¯n and the mass of entrants
MEnj in that sector using (20). From (22), we can write this mass of entrants in terms of the
sector’s labor supply Lnj . This yields the following expression for the domestic cutoff:
(
ϕ∗nnj
)k
= ϕkmin
σj − 1
kj − (σj − 1)
fnnj
fEnj
1
βjL¯n
Lnj
λnnj
. (25)
By combining (25) and (24), we obtain an expression for welfare that depends only on the en-
dogenous ratio of labor supply to domestic trade shares Lnj/λnnj across sectors. This expression
does not contain any per-unit or fixed trade cost measures, τnij or fnij for i 6= n, so the ratios
Lnj/λnnj are sufficient statistics that summarize the impact of trade costs on welfare. We can
thus summarize the welfare gains from trade, measured as the welfare ratio Uˆn ≡ UOpenn /UClosedn
(between the open and closed economies) in terms of a country’s domestic trade shares λOpennnj (the
domestic trade shares in the closed economy are fixed at λClosednnj = 1) and the change in sectoral
labor allocations between the open and closed economies (Lˆnj = L
Open
nj /L
Closed
nj ):
Uˆn =
J∏
j=1
(
λˆnnj
Lˆnj
)−βj
kj
=
J∏
j=1
(
λOpennnj
)−βj
kj
(
LOpennj
LClosednj
)βj
kj
.
Also, we note that the only relevant parameters for this welfare gain calculation are the expenditure
shares (βj) and trade elasticities (kj). Lower trade costs have a direct impact on the welfare gains
by lowering the domestic trade shares λOpennnj . They also have an indirect effect via the reallocation
of labor across sectors. This channel operates through the welfare benefits of higher entry rates
(which leads to additional product variety), and is therefore absent in models of trade where the
range of consumed goods is constant. To motivate the direction of the welfare gain for this channel,
we return to our scenario that adds an additional homogenous good sector j = 0 that is produced in
every country. In that scenario (with symmetric trade and production costs), we saw that opening
to trade would reallocate labor LOpennj to the differentiated sectors j ≥ 1 for larger countries (larger
L¯n). This generates distributional effects for the gains from trade, skewing those gains towards
larger markets. (If we break the symmetry assumption for trade costs, then countries with better
geography would also increase their relative employment in the differentiated goods sectors, skewing
the gains from trade in their favor.). Balistreri et al (2011) provide a quantitative assessment of
the gains from trade liberalization that accounts for these inter-sectoral labor reallocations, based
on differences in country size, geography, and comparative advantage.
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In the special case where labor allocations across sectors do not change following the opening
of trade, the open economy domestic trade shares λOpennnj provide the single sufficient statistics for
the welfare gains from trade.32 This version of the model falls within a class of models analyzed by
Arkolakis et al. (2012a). They show that when these models are calibrated to the same empirical
trade shares (for the open economy equilibrium), they will all imply the same welfare gains from
trade. But note that countries’ trade shares with themselves are endogenous variables and can
have different determinants in different models. In heterogeneous firm models, the overall welfare
gains from trade are composed of both increases in average productivity and changes in variety. In
contrast, in homogeneous firm models such as Krugman (1980), they are composed of changes in
variety alone. In Melitz and Redding (2012), we show that the homogeneous firm model of Krugman
(1980) generates different levels of this endogenous trade share than the heterogeneous firm model
(given the same exogenous parameters for trade costs and product differentiation). The additional
adjustment margin of average productivity in the heterogeneous firm model implies greater welfare
gains from a given change in trade costs than in the homogeneous firm benchmark. We also show
these differences in welfare gains to be quantitatively substantial.
While our discussion above concentrates on aggregate bilateral trade shares, models of firm
heterogeneity in differentiated product markets provide a rationale for the prevalence of zeros in
bilateral trade flows. Helpman et al. (2008) develop a multi-country version of the model in Section
3, in which the productivity distribution is a truncated Pareto. In this case, no firm exports from
country i to market n if the productivity cutoff (ϕ∗ni) lies above the upper limit of country i’s
productivity distribution. Estimating a structural gravity equation, they show that controlling for
the non-random selection of positive trade flows and the extensive margin of exporting firms is
important for estimates of the trade effects of standard trade frictions.
Structural Estimation
In addition to shedding new light on aggregate bilateral trade flows, models of firm heterogeneity in
differentiated product markets also provide a natural platform for explaining a number of features of
disaggregated trade data by firm and destination market. As shown in Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz
(2011), disaggregated French trade data exhibit a number of striking empirical regularities. First,
the number of French firms selling to a market (relative to French market share) increases with
market size according to an approximately log linear relationship. This pattern of firm export
32This only holds for these specific parametric assumptions on preferences (CES) and productivity (Pareto).
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market participation exhibits an imperfect hierarchy, where firms selling to less popular markets
are more likely to sell to more popular markets, but do not always do so. Second, export sales
distributions are similar across markets of very different size and export propensities by French
firms. While the upper tail of these distributions is approximately distributed Pareto, there are
departures from a Pareto distribution in the lower tail, where small export shipments are observed.
Third, average sales in France are higher for firms selling to less popular foreign markets and for
firms selling to more foreign markets.
To account for these features of the data, Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2011) use a version of
the model from Section 3 with a Pareto productivity distribution and a fixed measure of potential
firms as in Chaney (2008). To explain variation in firm export participation with market size under
CES demand, fixed market entry costs are required. But to generate the departures from a Pareto
distribution in the lower tail, these fixed market entry costs are allowed to vary endogenously with
a firm’s choice of the fraction of consumers within a market to serve (e), as in Arkolakis (2010).
Finally, to explain imperfect hierarchies of markets, fixed market entry costs are assumed to be
subject to an idiosyncratic shock for each firm ω and destination market n (εnω). There is also a
common shock for each source country i and destination market n (Fni). Market entry costs are
therefore:
fniω = εnωFniM (e) ,
where the function M (e) determines how market entry costs vary with the fraction of consumers
served (e) and takes the following form:
M (e) =
1− (1− e)1−1/λ
1− 1/λ ,
where λ > 0 captures the increasing cost of reaching a larger fraction of consumers. Any given
consumer is served with probability e, so that each consumer receives the same measure of varieties,
but the particular varieties in question can vary across consumers.33
To allow for idiosyncratic variation in sales conditional on entering a given export market for
firms with a given productivity, demand is also subject to an idiosyncratic shock for each firm ω
33To generate the observed departures from a Pareto distribution in the lower tail of the export sales distribution,
one requires 0 < λ < 1, which implies an increasing marginal cost of reaching additional consumers. An alternative
potential explanation for the departures from a Pareto distribution in the lower tail is a variable elasticity of substi-
tution. Both endogenous market entry costs and a variable elasticity of substitution provide potential explanations
for empirical findings that most of the growth in trade following trade liberalization is in goods previously traded in
small amounts, as in Kehoe and Ruhl (2009).
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and destination market n, αnω:
Xniω = αnωeniωXn
(
τnipiω
Pn
)1−σ
,
where Xn is total expenditure in market n and the presence of eniω reflects the fact that only a
fraction of consumers in each market are served. A firm’s decision to enter a market depends on the
composite shock, ηnω = αnω/εnω, but a firm with a given productivity can enter a market because
of a low entry shock, εnω, and yet still have low sales in that market because of a low demand
shock, αnω.
Using moments of the French trade data by firm and destination market, Eaton, Kortum and
Kramarz (2011) estimate the model’s five key parameters: a composite parameter including the
elasticity of substitution and the Pareto shape parameter, the convexity of marketing costs, the
variance of demand shocks, the variance of entry shocks, and the correlation between demand and
entry shocks. These five parameters are precisely estimated and the estimated model provides a
good fit to the data. Firm productivity accounts for around half of the observed variation across
firms in export market participation, but explains substantially less of the variation in exports
conditional on entering a market.
The estimated model is used to undertake counterfactuals, such as a 10 percent reduction in
bilateral trade barriers for all French firms. In this counterfactual, total sales by French firms rise by
around $16 million, with most of this increase accounted for by a rise in sales of the top decile of firms
of around $23 million. In contrast, every other decile of firms experiences a decline in sales, with
around half of the firms in the bottom decile exiting. These results suggest that even empirically
reasonable changes in trade frictions can involve substantial intra-industry reallocations.34
7 Factor Abundance and Heterogeneity
While models of firm heterogeneity in differentiated product markets emphasize within-industry
reallocations, traditional trade theories instead stress between-industry reallocations. Bernard,
Redding and Schott (2007) combine these two dimensions of reallocation by incorporating the
model in Section 3 into the integrated equilibrium framework of neoclassical trade theory. Com-
parative advantage is introduced by supposing that sectors differ in their relative factor intensity
34See Corcos, Del Gatto and Ottaviano (2012) for a quantitative analysis of European integration using a model
of firm heterogeneity and trade. See Cherkashin et al. (2010) for a quantitative analysis of the Bangladeshi apparel
sector.
35
and countries differ in their relative factor abundance. The production technology within each sec-
tor is homothetic such that the entry cost and the fixed and variable production costs use the two
factors of production with the same intensity. The total cost of producing q(ϕ) units of a variety
in sector j in country i is thus:
Γij =
[
fij +
qij(ϕ)
ϕ
]
(wSi)
βj (wLi)
1−βj , 1 > β1 > β2 > 0
where wSi is the skilled wage and wLi is the unskilled wage.
In the special case in which fixed and variable trade costs are equal to zero, all firms export and
the concept of integrated equilibrium from Dixit and Norman (1980) and Helpman and Krugman
(1985) can be used to determine the set of factor allocations to the two countries for which trade in
goods alone can equalize factor prices. Within this factor price equalization set, the four theorems
of the Heckscher-Ohlin model – the Factor Price Equalization, Stolper-Samuelson, Rybczynski and
Heckscher-Ohlin Theorems – continue to hold with firm heterogeneity.
More generally, if fixed and variable trade costs are not equal to zero, factor price equalization
breaks down and the opening of trade results in intra-industry reallocations across firms (assuming
parameter values that deliver selection into export markets). As these intra-industry reallocations
are driven by the differential impact of the opening of trade on exporters and non-exporters, they
are stronger in the comparative advantage sector, where export opportunities are relatively more
attractive. Although there is a decline in the relative mass of firms in the comparative disadvantage
sector, as factors of production are reallocated in accordance with comparative advantage, exit
by low productivity firms is strongest in the comparative advantage sector. Thus the opening
of trade leads to a larger increase in the zero-profit cutoff and in average productivity in the
comparative advantage sector than in the comparative disadvantage sector. This differential impact
of the opening of trade across sectors according to Heckscher-Ohlin-based comparative advantage
influences the effect of trade liberalization on welfare and income distribution. In addition to
the standard Stolper-Samuelson effects of trade liberalization, the real reward of each factor is
influenced by changes in product variety (as in Helpman and Krugman 1985) and increases with
average productivity in each sector. As a result, it becomes possible for trade liberalization to raise
rather than reduce the real reward of the scarce factor.
A number of studies have further explored the relationship between within and between-industry
reallocations of resources. Fan et al. (2011) and Hsieh and Ossa (2011) embed firm heterogeneity
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within a Ricardian model with a continuum of goods. Lu (2012) develops a version of the model we
have outlined, but specifically considers the case where the domestic market access costs are high
enough to generate tougher selection there relative to the export market. In this case, all surviving
firms export but only a subset of relatively more productive firms serve the domestic market. She
documents that this domestic/export market “reversal” occurs for Chinese firms in sectors where
China enjoys a strong comparative advantage relative to its trading partners. Burstein and Vogel
(2012a) and Rescheff and Harrigan (2012) explore complementarities between heterogeneous firm
productivity and skill intensity, and how this affects the impact of trade liberalization on wage
inequality. Burstein and Vogel (2012b) provide general conditions under which changes in the
factor content of trade are a sufficient condition for changes in relative factor prices.
8 Trade and Market Size
One limitation of the theoretical framework considered so far is its assumption of constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) preferences, which imply constant mark-ups and hence that changes in ag-
gregate demand leave the productivity cutoff for production unchanged. In this section, we extend
our analysis of firm heterogeneity to the case of variable mark-ups following Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008). Aggregate market conditions are summarized by the “toughness” of competition, which
depends on market size in the closed economy and on both market size and trade costs in the open
economy. “Tougher” competition in a market is characterized by a larger number of sellers and a
lower average price of sellers, which both induce a downward shift in distribution of markups across
firms. Differences in competition across markets then feed back and influence firm location and
export decisions. Markets that have more attractive fundamentals (for firms) are characterized in
equilibrium by “tougher” competition, which implies that it is harder for exporters to break into
these markets and harder for domestic firms to survive in these markets.
Consumer preferences are assumed to be quasi-linear between a homogeneous and differentiated
sector with quadratic preferences across varieties within the differentiated sector, as in Ottaviano,
Tabuchi and Thisse (2002):
Ui = q
c
0i + α
∫
ω∈Ωi
qcωidω −
1
2
γ
∫
ω∈Ωi
(qcωi)
2 dω − 1
2
η
(∫
ω∈Ωi
qcωidω
)2
,
where qcωi and q
c
0i denote the representative consumer’s consumption of differentiated variety ω and
the homogeneous good; Ωi is the set of varieties available for consumption in country i. Higher α
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and lower η increase demand for differentiated varieties relative to the numeraire, while higher γ
implies greater love of variety, with γ = 0 corresponding to the special case of perfect substitutes.
Labor is the sole factor of production and each country i is endowed with Li workers. Total
demand for each variety is therefore Liq
c
ωi, where Li indexes market size. Each country’s labor
endowment is assumed to be sufficiently large that it both consumes and produces the homogeneous
good, which is chosen as the numeraire, so that p0i = 1. As long as the homogeneous good is
consumed, quasi-linear-quadratic preferences imply that the demand for differentiated varieties can
be determined independently of income. Using the first-order conditions for utility maximization,
the inverse demand curve for each differentiated variety is:
pωi = α− γqcωi − ηQci , Qci =
∫
ω∈Ωi
qcωidω. (26)
Since the marginal utility of consuming a differentiated variety is finite at zero consumption,
there is a threshold or choke price above which demand for a variety is zero. Using (26) this
threshold can be written:
pωi ≤ 1
ηNi + γ
(γα+ ηNip¯i) , (27)
where Ni is the number of consumed varieties and p¯i is their average price. This choke price
decreases as the number of consumed varieties rises and as their average price falls (tougher com-
petition). Welfare is given by the indirect utility function:
Ui = I
c
i +
1
2
(
η +
γ
Ni
)−1
(α− p¯i)2 + 1
2
Ni
γ
σ2pi,
where Ici is the representative consumer’s income; p¯i and σ
2
pi are the mean and variance of prices.
Welfare increases when average prices fall, when the number of varieties increases (consumer love
of variety) and when the variance of prices increases (as the variance of prices increases, consumers
can substitute towards lower-priced varieties).
The homogeneous good is produced under conditions of perfect competition and constant re-
turns to scale with a unit labor requirement. As long as the homogeneous good is produced,
productivity in this sector pins down a unitary wage in each country. Differentiated varieties are
produced under conditions of monopolistic competition and constant returns to scale. To enter the
differentiated sector, a firm must incur a sunk entry cost of fE units of labor, after which its unit
labor requirement or cost (c) is drawn from a cumulative distribution function G (c) with support
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on [0, cM ]. This cost draw is the inverse of the productivity draw considered in Section 3. As firms
with the same cost (c) behave symmetrically, firms are indexed from now on by c alone. If a firm
decides to export, it faces iceberg variable costs of trade, such that τij > 1 units of a variety must
be exported from country i to country j in order for one unit to arrive.
Since demand exhibits a choke price, firm exit occurs even in the absence of fixed production
costs. Firms drawing a marginal cost above the choke price (27) in the domestic market exit, because
they cannot generate positive profits from production. In the closed economy, the zero-profit cost
cutoff (cDi) is a sufficient statistic that completely summarizes the competitive environment and
determines firm outcomes as a function of their cost draw (c):
pi(c) =
1
2
(cDi + c) prices
µi(c) = pi(c)− c = 1
2
(cDi − c) markups
ri(c) =
Li
4γ
[
(cDi)
2 − c2
]
revenues
pii(c) =
Li
4γ
(cDi − c)2 profits.
As in the model with CES preferences in Section 3, more productive firms (with lower c) have
lower prices (pi(c)), higher output and revenue (ri(c)) and higher profits (pii(c)). In contrast to
the model with CES preferences, more productive firms (with lower c) now also have higher mark-
ups (µi(c)). Firms with lower marginal cost charge higher mark-ups because their marginal cost
intersects marginal revenue at a more inelastic segment of the demand curve. Since more productive
firms do not fully pass on their lower marginal costs to consumers, they have higher revenue-based
productivity (ri(l)/li(c)) even in the absence of fixed production costs.
Under the assumption that productivity (1/c) is Pareto distributed with lower bound 1/cM and
shape parameter k, the closed economy cost cutoff is given by:
cDi =
(
γφ
Li
) 1
k+2
,
where φ = 2(k+ 1)(k+ 2)ckMfE . The closed economy cost cutoff falls (higher average productivity)
when varieties are closer substitutes (lower γ), when there is a better distribution of cost draws
(lower cM ), when sunk costs fall (lower fE) and in bigger markets (higher Li). Each of these
comparative statics induces an increase in the “toughness of competition” in the form of a larger
number of varieties consumed (higher Ni) and lower average prices (lower p¯i).
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We now describe the effects of increased market size in further detail. Holding the number of
products and their prices fixed, an increase in market size proportionately increases demand for
all products. In equilibrium, this generates additional entry. As the number of consumed varieties
rises, the new demand curves also shift in. The combination of these two effects generates a rotation
of each firm’s residual demand curve: demand is lower at higher prices, higher at lower prices, and
more elastic at any given price. This induces high cost firms to exit, and a downward shift in the
distribution of markups for the remaining firms. Thus, larger markets are characterized by lower
prices, both because of higher average productivity (a lower zero-profit cost cutoff cDi) and lower
mark-ups for a firm with a given productivity. Average firm size is higher due to the expansion of
the low cost firms. Consumers in larger markets also enjoy higher welfare, because of both greater
product variety and lower prices. The lower cost cutoff in larger markets reduces the dispersion in
productivity, prices and mark-ups (by compressing the range of firm costs [0, cDi]). On the other
hand, the dispersion of firm size increases, both in terms of output and revenue. These comparative
statics for market size are consistent with the empirical findings in Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005)
and Syverson (2004).35
In the open economy, markets are assumed to be segmented. Due to the constant returns in
production, each firm maximizes independently the profits earned from domestic and export sales.36
The demand-side choke prices imply that fixed exporting costs are not needed to generate selection
into export markets. A firm’s marginal costs may lie below the choke price in the domestic market,
but may be above the choke price in the foreign market once variable trade costs are taken into
account. In this case, the firm serves the domestic market only.
In an open economy equilibrium with symmetric trade costs (τni = τ > 1 for all n 6= i and
τii = 1), the zero-profit and exporting cost cutoffs are given by:
cDi =
{
γφ
Li [1 + (M − 1) τ−k]
} 1
k+2
, i ∈ {1, . . . ,M},
cXni =
cDn
τ
, i, n ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. (28)
Therefore costly trade does not completely integrate markets and market size differences affect cost
cutoffs and have qualitatively similar effects as in the closed economy. Larger markets attract more
35See Combes et al. (2012) for evidence on the contributions of agglomeration and selection towards the higher
productivity of larger cities.
36In equilibrium, prices are such that there are no profitable arbitrage opportunities across markets, because firms
absorb a portion of the trade cost difference across markets into lower prices (dumping).
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firms, which implies “tougher” competition in the presence of trade costs, and hence leads to a
lower cost cutoff and higher average productivity.
Multilateral trade liberalization (a reduction in the common value of variable trade costs τ)
again causes intra-industry reallocation by reducing the zero-profit cost cutoff in (28), which induces
low productivity firms to exit and shifts the composition of output towards more productive firms.
Similar to the impact of increased market size, multilateral trade liberalization induces more elastic
demand for all firms. The surviving firms respond by lowering their markups. Thus, prices fall due
to the combined effect of higher average productivity (a lower cost cutoff cDi) and lower mark-ups.
This pro-competitive effect is consistent with empirical evidence from trade liberalization episodes
(see the empirical studies discussed in Section 2 and the survey by Tybout 2003) and introduces
a new channel for welfare gains from trade (in addition to changes in product variety and average
productivity).
Given the presence of an outside sector, the model also features a home market effect, which
influences the effects of unilateral and preferential trade liberalization. In the short-run, holding
the number of firms in each country fixed, all countries experience welfare gains from unilateral or
preferential trade liberalization. This is no longer the case in the long-run, once the number of firms
in each country adjusts. If one country unilaterally reduces its import barriers, it can experience
welfare losses, as production relocates to other countries to access these markets without trade costs
and take advantage of the lower import barriers in the liberalizing country. All of these results
relate to the case of variable trade costs that use real resources. If trade barriers instead take the
form of tariffs that raise revenue, then this revenue affects the welfare analysis.
While we focus on the quasi-linear-quadratic demand system as a particularly tractable frame-
work to analyze the effects of trade in the presence of firm heterogeneity and variable mark-ups,
other research has considered Bertrand competition (Bernard et al. 2003, Blas and Russ 2012, and
Holmes et al. 2012), Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) preferences (Behrens and Murata
2012), translog preferences (Feenstra 2003), and general additively-separable utility (Zhelobodko
et al. 2010). Taking a different approach, Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (2012) introduce variable
mark-ups into a CES demand system by considering the case of a finite number of firms.37
37In these models of firm heterogeneity with variable mark-ups, the impact of changes in variable trade costs on
the distribution of prices and welfare depends critically on the productivity distribution. Under the assumption that
productivity is Pareto distributed, Arkolakis et al. (2012b) show that for a class of preferences featuring variable
elasticities of demand and choke prices, the distribution of prices conditional on purchasing a variety is invariant to
changes in variable trade costs and the welfare gains from trade can be expressed in terms of a country’s trade share
with itself and a parametric correction for variable mark-ups.
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9 Endogenous Firm Productivity
Up to now, we have assumed that firm productivity is exogenously set at entry and therefore
does not respond endogenously to trade liberalization. Recent research has focused on numerous
extensions where firms can affect their productivity via decisions regarding the range of products
produced, innovation and technology adoption, and how production is organized. These decisions,
in turn, are affected by the trading environment and the firm’s trade participation. This induces a
complementarity between choices regarding trade and firm productivity.
In this section, we begin by developing some of these extensions regarding product scope (and
the emergence of multi-product firms), innovation, and technology adoption within a static model.
Firms make a one-time joint decision regarding this additional characteristic along with the produc-
tion and trade decisions that we have previously analyzed. This introduces a distinction between
a firm’s productivity draw upon entry and its measured productivity, which reflects its decisions
about product scope, innovation and technology adoption. We next transition to consider some
dynamic models in order to analyze the joint evolution of firm productivity and export market
participation over time. In these models, firm productivity can evolve due to exogenous shocks,
but also as an outcome of endogenous innovation or technology adoption decisions. These dynamic
models capture the complementarity between firm productivity and trade both in the cross-section
and time dimensions: the decision to export at one point in time is linked to other decisions
regarding innovation or technology adoption at other points in time.
A key feature of all the models covered in this section is that trade liberalization can raise
firm-level productivity (as well as generate increases in aggregate productivity via between-firm
reallocations of resources as analyzed in previous sections).
Product Scope Decision and Multi-Product Firms
One of the striking features of international trade is the extent to which it is concentrated in the
hands of a relatively small number of firms supplying many products to many destinations. For
example, Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) report that U.S. firms exporting more than
five ten-digit products to more than five destinations account for only around 12 percent of exporters
but 92 percent of export value.38 Motivated by such evidence, a growing body of theoretical and
empirical research has sought to model the implications of multi-product, multi-destination firms
38Similar results are found for other countries, as summarized in Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) and World Trade
Organization (2008).
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for understanding aggregate and disaggregate patterns of trade.39
The model of firm heterogeneity in differentiated product markets developed in Section 3 admits
a natural generalization to incorporate multi-product firms, as explored in Bernard, Redding and
Schott (2011). Suppose that the representative consumer derives utility from the consumption of
a continuum of symmetric products h defined on the interval [0, 1]:
U =
[∫ 1
0
Cνhdh
] 1
ν
, 0 < ν < 1.
Within each product, a continuum of firms supply differentiated varieties of the product. Incurring
the sunk entry cost fE creates a firm brand that can be used to supply one horizontally-differentiated
variety of each of the continuum of products. Varieties are assumed to be differentiated from one
another by their brand, which implies that a given brand cannot be used to supply more than
one differentiated variety of each product. After incurring the sunk entry cost, a firm observes
realizations of two stochastic shocks to profitability: “ability” ϕ ∈ (0,∞), which is common to all
products and drawn from a distribution g (ϕ), and “product attributes ” λh ∈ (0,∞), which are
specific to each product h and possibly to each destination market and drawn from a distribution
z (λ). A firm in each country i faces a fixed cost of supplying each market n (Fni) and an additional
fixed cost of supplying each product to that market (fni).
Sectoral equilibrium can be determined using a similar approach as in Section 3. There is a
product attributes cutoff for each firm ability ϕ (λ∗ni (ϕ)) above which a firm can profitably export
a product from country i to market n:
pini (ϕ, λ
∗
ni (ϕ)) =
rni (ϕ, λ
∗
ni (ϕ))
σ
− fni = 0.
There is also a firm ability cutoff (ϕ∗ni) above which a firm can generate enough total variable profits
from exporting its range of profitable products from country i to country n to cover the fixed costs
of serving market n (Fn):
pini (ϕ
∗
ni) =
∫ ∞
λ∗ni(ϕ∗ni)
pini (ϕ
∗
ni, λ) z (λ) dλ− Fni = 0.
Higher ability firms can generate sufficient variable profits to cover the product fixed cost at a
39While early research on multi-product firms and trade, such as Ottaviano and Thisse (2011) and Allanson and
Montagna (2005), modeled firms and products symmetrically, more recent research has emphasized heterogeneity
both within and across firms.
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lower value of product attributes, and therefore supply a wider range of products to each market.
For sufficiently low values of firm ability, the excess of variable profits over product fixed costs in the
small range of profitable products does not cover the fixed cost of serving the market and therefore
the firm does not supply the market. The lowest-ability firms exit, intermediate-ability firms serve
only the domestic market and the highest ability firms export. Within exporters, products with the
worst attributes are supplied only to the domestic market, while products with the best attributes
are exported to the largest number of markets.
This theoretical framework features selection both within and across firms. Trade liberalization
raises average industry productivity not only through the exit of the least productive firms, but also
through surviving firms dropping their least-successful products. Consistent with these predictions,
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011) find that U.S. firms more exposed to tariff reductions under
the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement reduce the number of products they produce relative to
firms less exposed to these tariff reductions.40 In this setting with selection within and across
firms, reductions in variable trade costs raise aggregate exports through the extensive margins of
the number of exporting firms and the number of exported products. In contrast, reductions in
variable trade costs have an ambiguous effect on average exports per firm and product. While higher
variable trade costs reduce exports for a given firm and product (decreasing average exports), they
also change export composition away from firms and products with small export values (increasing
average exports). Consistent with these predictions, Bernard, Redding and Schott (2011) find that
the negative effect of distance on aggregate trade flows in the gravity equation is largely accounted
for by the extensive margins of firms and products. The effect on the intensive margin (average
exports per firm and product) is positive but not statistically significant.
Mayer et al. (2012) introduce multi-product firms into the model of firm heterogeneity with
variable mark-ups developed in Section 8. Firms face a product ladder along which productiv-
ity/quality declines discretely for each additional variety produced. Differences in the toughness
of competition across markets induce changes to both the extensive and intensive product margin
within firms. Mayer et al. (2012) focus on the effects of competition on the intensive product
margin. Due to the variable price elasticities, firms selling the same set of products in different
markets skew their sales towards their best performing products in markets where they face tougher
40Evidence of similar product rationalization in Canada is found by Baldwin and Gu (2009). Product adding and
dropping is shown to be an important source of aggregate reallocation in Bernard, Redding and Schott (2010a).
Around one half of surviving U.S. firms add and/or drop products from their existing range every five years, and
the contribution of these added and dropped products to aggregate output is of around the same magnitude as the
contribution of firm entry and exit.
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competition (due to the higher price elasticities in those markets). Data on French exporters across
export market destinations provides strong empirical confirmation of this competitive effect.41
Another source of pro-competitive effects arises when the monopolistic competition assumption
is dropped and firms internalize the effects of new products on the sales of their existing products
(a cannibalization effect). Eckel and Neary (2010) develop such a model and highlight how this
cannibalization effect generates an additional incentive for multi-product firms to drop their worst
performing products when faced with increased competition from trade. Thus, trade liberalization
generates higher firm productivity and, potentially, lower product variety.42
Innovation
Recent empirical work has consistently found that exporters (relative to non-exporters) are sig-
nificantly more likely to innovate and adopt new technologies. For example, Verhoogen (2008)
reports that Mexican exporters (plants) are more likely to be ISO 9000 certified (a proxy for the
use of more advanced production techniques); and Bustos (2011) reports that Argentinian exporters
(firms) spend more on new technologies (per worker).
As trade liberalization induces firms to start exporting, it is also associated with increased
innovation and technology use by those new exporters. Bustos (2011) finds that the Mercosur
trade liberalization agreement generated substantial increases in spending on new technologies by
new exporters (and some increased spending by existing exporters). Verhoogen (2008) finds that
the Mexican peso devaluation in the 1990s induced substantial increases in both plant exports
and ISO 9000 certification. Lileeva and Trefler (2010) use econometric techniques to identify the
effect of lower U.S. import tariffs on the innovation and technology adoption rates of new Canadian
exporters. They find those tariff cuts (part of the CUSFTA trade agreement) induced higher rates
of product innovation and of advanced manufacturing technologies by new Canadian exporters.
Those changes, in turn, led to substantial increases in labor productivity for those new exporters:
over 15% between 1984 and 1996.
In the following two subsections, we describe two modeling techniques to capture the joint
innovation and export decisions by heterogeneous firms. The first technique deals with a binary
innovation choice (such as technology adoption) while the latter captures a continuous innovation
41See Arkolakis and Muendler (2012) and Nocke and Yeaple (2006) for other monopolistically competitive models
of multi-product firms.
42See also Feenstra and Ma (2008) and Dhingra (2010) for other models of multi-product firms and trade featuring
cannibalization effects.
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intensity decision.
A Binary Innovation Choice: Technology Adoption
We briefly sketch how to add a binary technology adoption choice alongside the production and
export decisions of heterogeneous firms. Bustos (2011) fully develops this theoretical modeling
extension.43 Every firm with productivity ϕ has the choice of upgrading to a new technology. This
choice involves a tradeoff between an additional fixed cost fI and a productivity increase to ιϕ,
where the proportional productivity increase ι > 1 is the same for all firms. Just like the export
decision, this technology adoption choice involves a tradeoff between a fixed cost and a per-unit
profit increase. Therefore technology adoption is characterized by a similar sorting according to
firm productivity, such that there is a productivity cutoff ϕ∗I above which all firms adopt the new
technology.44 The ranking of the export and innovation cutoffs ϕ∗X and ϕ
∗
I (assuming symmetric
trade and production costs, so there is a single export cutoff) depends on the innovation parameter
values fI and ι, the trade costs fX and τ , and the overhead production cost f . Bustos (2011)
provides the conditions such that ϕ∗I > ϕ
∗
X , which implies that some exporters do not innovate
(which is the empirically relevant case for the Argentinian data). In any event, this modeling
framework implies that (a) the most productive firms will choose to both innovate and export, (b)
firms of lower productivity only export, (c) firms of still lower productivity choose to do neither,
and (d) the least productive firms exit. This framework therefore captures the correlation between
trade and innovation that is so prominent empirically in the cross-section of firms.
Several other firm decisions have been modeled in a similar way as involving a tradeoff be-
tween a fixed cost and a benefit that scales with firm size. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004)
consider horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI). Antra`s and Helpman (2004) analyze the de-
cision whether to organize production at home or abroad within or beyond the boundaries of the
firm. Manova (2012) examines the financing choice of firms and how it interacts with their export
decision. Another line of work focuses on the decision to import intermediate inputs, as in Amiti
and Davis (2012), Gopinath and Neiman (2012), and Goldberg et al. (2010). More generally, other
research examines the choice of firm organization and how it interacts with firm productivity and
export status; see Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012).
43This model extension, in turn, is based on previous work by Yeaple (2005).
44Firm profits are log-supermodular in productivity, technology adoption, and export status, leading to this strict
sorting behavior. This is a specific example of the more general case analyzed by Costinot (2009) where firms or
factors can sort into multiple different activities (see the working paper version of that paper for a more detailed
derivation of the firm-sorting case).
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Innovation Intensity
We now turn to the modeling of innovation intensity allowing for continuous differences in the level
of innovation performed by different firms. Following the seminal contributions by Aghion and
Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Romer (1990), there has been a long literature
analyzing how market size and globalization affect the firm innovation intensity choice. Initially,
this literature did not focus on cross-sectional differences in innovation intensity across firms; more
recently, Atkeson and Burstein (2010) have built a model featuring variation in innovation intensity
across firms and over time in response to globalization shocks. We discuss the introduction of firm
dynamics in the next section but first sketch out a static version of the innovation intensity decision
used by Atkeson and Burstein (2010).
Consider a rescaling of firm productivity φ = ϕσ−1 such that this new productivity measure φ
is now proportional to firm size.45 As with the case of the binary innovation choice, we assume
that successful innovation increases productivity by a fixed factor ι > 1 (from φ to ιφ). However,
the probability of successful innovation is now an endogenous variable α that reflects a firm’s
innovation intensity choice. The cost of higher innovation intensity is determined by an exogenous
convex function cI(α) ≥ 0 and scales up proportionally with firm size and productivity φ, so the
total cost of innovation intensity α is φcI(α). This scaling of innovation cost with firm size is needed
in a dynamic setting to deliver the prediction of Gibrat’s Law that growth rates for large firms are
independent of their size.
We first examine the choice of innovation intensity in a closed economy. Consider a firm with
productivity φ that is sufficiently high that the firm will produce even if innovation is unsuccessful.
This firm will choose innovation intensity α to maximize expected profits
E[pi(φ)] = [(1− α) + αι]Bφ− φcI(α)− f,
where B is the same market demand parameter for the domestic economy as in previous sections.
The first-order condition is given by
c′I(α) = (ι− 1)B. (29)
This implies that, in the closed economy, all firms (above a certain productivity threshold satisfy-
45Since the rescaling involves the demand side product differentiation parameter σ, caution must be used when
interpreting any comparative statics that include this parameter.
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ing the no exit restriction) will choose the same innovation intensity α. In a dynamic setting, this
delivers Gibrat’s Law for those firms, and also generates an ergodic distribution of firm produc-
tivity (hence firm size) that is Pareto in the upper tail independently of the initial distribution of
productivity upon entry.46
Consider now the innovation intensity choice in an open economy setting with two symmetric
countries (and symmetric trade costs) and selection into export markets. The first-order condition
for non-exporters will still be given by (29). However, successful innovation is more valuable to
exporters because it will generate additional profits from export sales. Their first-order condition
is given by:47
c′I(α) = (ι− 1)B(1 + τ1−σ).
Thus, exporters will choose a higher innovation intensity than non-exporters. As with non-
exporters, all large exporters (firms who will export regardless of the innovation outcome) will
choose the same innovation intensity. This modeling of innovation intensity can therefore also
replicate the complementarity between innovation and trade. It also offers a particularly tractable
way of incorporating endogenous innovation into a dynamic model of trade and innovation, such
as the one analyzed by Atkeson and Burstein (2010).
Dynamics
All the models that we have considered up to now have been static. They contrast an ex-ante
period (featuring idiosyncratic firm uncertainty) with a single ex-post period where all uncertainty
is realized, firms jointly make all their decisions, and profit is earned. One can also think of this
outcome as the stationary equilibrium of a dynamic model where the aggregate conditions remain
constant over time. Melitz (2003) describes a simple version of such a stationary equilibrium, where
firms face a single additional source of idiosyncratic uncertainty: a death shock that occurs with
probability δ ∈ (0, 1) and is independent of firm productivity ϕ. The key free entry and zero cutoff
profit conditions that we have previously described are then very similar. In those conditions, firm
profit is replaced by firm value, which is just the net present value of the non-fluctuating profits
earned in every period (the death shock generates a discount factor for the value computation).
46See the web appendix. The exact shape of the ergodic distribution is sensitive to whether Gibrat’s Law holds
for all productivities or only for productivities above a certain threshold. See Luttmer (2010) for a review of this
literature.
47This is the first-order condition for firms who will export regardless of whether innovation is successful. The
condition for a firm whose export decision is tied to innovation success would be different.
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As in the static version of the model, the sunk nature of the entry cost fE is a critical component
for delivering ex-post firm heterogeneity. On the other hand, the modeling of the fixed export cost
as either sunk or paid in every export period does not affect the stationary equilibrium: there is
no uncertainty regarding the export market so firms are indifferent between paying an overhead
fixed export cost in every period or its net present value once prior to exporting for the first time.
Any uncertainty regarding future export profits will break this equivalence. Sunk export costs then
generate hysteresis behavior associated with export market entry and exit.48
The combination of sunk entry costs and uncertainty leads to option values associated with
entry and exit (manifested by hysteresis). Although there is substantial empirical support for this
type of behavior, the modeling of those option values in a dynamic general equilibrium model
with heterogeneous firms adds some substantial complexity. As an alternative, significant gains in
tractability can be achieved by analyzing dynamic versions of the model that do not feature firm
option values. For example, assuming that the fixed export cost is paid per period (and not sunk)
will eliminate the option value associated with export market entry/exit. The sunk entry cost fE
must be preserved to generate ex-post heterogeneity; however, if the overhead production cost f is
eliminated, then firm exit is exogenously determined by the death shock δ (and not endogenously
due to low productivity), and the option value associated with entry/exit is eliminated. Ghironi
and Melitz (2005) make these assumptions and then embed the steady-state version of the Melitz
(2003) model from Section 3 into a two country dynamic model featuring stochastic fluctuations
in aggregate variables (a standard DSGE open economy model). Ottaviano (2012) incorporates a
dynamic version of the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) model from Section 8 into a business cycle
setting.
This type of modeling allows firm productivity to change over time due to changes in aggregate
productivity, but the relative productivity of firms remains constant. Other models have incor-
porated sources of firm-level fluctuations such as idiosyncratic productivity shocks alongside the
aggregate fluctuations. Alessandria and Choi (2007) and Ruhl (2004) use variants of this type of
model to analyze the growth dynamics of exporters in response to changes in trade costs. They
characterize both the firm-level responses as well as the aggregate trade response.49 More recently,
48See Baldwin (1988) for an early theoretical derivation of this hysteresis effect. Roberts and Tybout (1997) find
strong evidence of such behavior for Colombian exporters. Subsequent firm-level empirical work has confirmed this
effect for other countries. Das et al (2007) use the same dataset of Colombian exporters and develop estimation
methods to recover the magnitude of the sunk export cost.
49Arkolakis (2011) and Irarrazabal and Opromolla (2008) analyze the stationary equilibrium in similar models.
They characterize the steady-state distribution of different types of firms and cohort dynamics in that equilibrium.
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the innovation choice decision described in the previous subsection has been incorporated into these
dynamic models. There is then both an endogenous (innovation) and exogenous component to the
evolution of firm productivity. Aw et al. (2011) estimate this joint model using production, trade,
and R&D data for Taiwanese firms. They find that endogenous productivity changes via R&D are
needed to explain the joint evolution of productivity and export decisions observed in the data.
Atkeson and Burstein (2010) analyze how modelling endogenous innovations in firm produc-
tivity influences the overall welfare gains from trade liberalization. Lower trade barriers boost
innovation by current and prospective exporters; however this also reduces the expected profits of
new entrants (who must then compete against much larger and more productive incumbents) and
thus reduces entry. Atkeson and Burstein (2010) calibrate their model to U.S. firm level data and
show that these two effects are largely offsetting, so that there is no substantial effect of trade liber-
alization on the growth rate of welfare – even when innovation is endogenous. Burstein and Melitz
(2012) use a very similar model, but focus on the transition paths following trade liberalization.
They highlight how firm productivity dynamics and export market selection combine to generate
long lasting adjustments to one-time changes in trade costs. Costantini and Melitz (2007) use a
binary innovation choice to analyze the timing of the innovation decision relative to the export de-
cision. They show that this relative timing is very sensitive to the timing and anticipation of trade
liberalization. Productivity increases following export market entry need not imply a learning by
exporting externality, but may rather reflect firms’ joint export and innovation decisions. A more
general insight is that measured firm productivity is the outcome of a number of endogenous de-
cisions which are taken jointly with trade participation (including both exporting and importing).
The contemporaneous relationship between productivity and trade participation therefore reflects
complex interactions between these decisions over time and should be interpreted with caution.
Although much of the literature on firm dynamics and trade has been focused on productivity,
an emerging literature considers dynamics generated by demand-side considerations. In contrast
to productivity shocks – which affect firm profitability in all markets – demand shocks generate
market-specific fluctuations in profitability. One strand of research emphasizes learning about
uncertain demand in markets as in Albornoz et al. (2012) and Akhmetova (2012). Another line of
work explores how matches between buyers and sellers evolve over time and across markets, as in
Eaton et al. (2012) and Chaney (2012). These papers all seek to explain empirical patterns of firm
entry and exit across export market destinations and over time. These empirical patterns include
high rates of firm exit from new export destinations as well as rapid firm export growth conditional
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on survival in these destinations.
10 Factor Markets
The model of firm heterogeneity in differentiated product markets developed in Section 3 implies
that firms are unevenly affected by trade liberalization: low-productivity firms exit, intermediate-
productivity domestic firms contract, and high-productivity exporting firms expand. However,
workers are symmetrically affected by trade liberalization, because they are identical and the labor
market is frictionless, which ensures that all workers are employed for a common wage. These
labor market implications contrast with the large empirical literature that finds an employer-size
wage premium (see, for example, the survey by Oi and Idson 1999) and with empirical findings of
wage differences between exporters and non-exporters even after conditioning on firm size (see, in
particular, Bernard and Jensen 1995, 1997).
More recent research on firm heterogeneity and trade has highlighted two sets of reasons why
wages can differ across firms. One line of research assumes competitive labor markets, so that
all workers with the same characteristics are paid the same wage, but wages can differ across
firms because of differences in workforce composition (see for example Bustos 2007, Sampson 2012,
Verhoogen 2008 and Yeaple 2005). Another line of research introduces labor market frictions, so
that workers with the same characteristics can be paid different wages by different firms. One source
of such labor market imperfections is search and matching frictions, which can generate variation
in wages with firm revenue through bargaining over the surplus from production (see for example
Davidson et al. 2008, Davidson and Matusz 2009, Cosar et al. 2011, and Helpman et al. 2010).
Another source of labor market imperfections is efficiency or fair wages, which can generate similar
wage variation if the wage that induces effort or is perceived to be fair varies with firm revenue (see
for example Amiti and Davis 2012, Davis and Harrigan 2011, and Egger and Kreickemeier 2009).
This class of theoretical models highlights a new mechanism for trade to affect wage inequality
based on wage variation across firms and the selection of firms into international trade. As shown
in Helpman et al. (2010), the opening of the closed economy to trade necessarily raises within-
industry wage inequality within a class of models satisfying three sufficient conditions: (a) wages
and employment are power functions of productivity, (b) only some firms export and exporting
raises the wage paid by a firm with a given productivity, (c) productivity is Pareto distributed.
When these three conditions are satisfied, the wage and employment of firms can be expressed
in terms of their productivity (ϕ) a term capturing whether or not a firm exports (Υ (ϕ)) the
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zero-profit cutoff productivity (ϕ∗) and parameters:
l(ϕ) = Υ(ϕ)ψl ld
(
ϕ
ϕ∗
)ζl
,
w(ϕ) = Υ(ϕ)ψwwd
(
ϕ
ϕ∗
)ζw
,
where ld and wd are employment and wage of the least productive firm and:
Υ(ϕ) =
 Υx > 11 for ϕ ≥ ϕ
∗
X
for ϕ < ϕ∗X
,
where Υx is the revenue premium from exporting for a firm of a given productivity. Using the Pareto
productivity distribution, the distribution of wages across workers within the industry, Gw (w), can
be evaluated as:
Gw (w) =

Sl,dGw,d (w) for wd≤ w ≤ wd (ϕx/ϕd)ζw ,
Sl,d for wd (ϕx/ϕd)
ζw ≤ w ≤ wx,
Sl,d + (1− Sl,d)Gw,x (w) for w ≥ wx,
where wx = wdΥ
ψw
x (ϕx/ϕd)
ζw is the wage of the least productive exporter and Sl,d is the employ-
ment share of domestic firms. The distribution of wages across workers employed by domestic firms,
Gw,d (w), is a truncated Pareto distribution:
Gw,d (w) =
1− (wdw )ζg
1−
(
wd
wx
)ζg for wd≤ w ≤ wd (ϕx/ϕd)ζw ,
while the distribution of wages across workers employed by exporters, Gw,x (w), is an un-truncated
Pareto distribution:
Gw,x (w) = 1−
(wx
w
)ζg
for w ≥ wx,
In the class of models satisfying the above three sufficient conditions, Helpman et al. (2010) show
that there is strictly greater wage inequality in the open economy when only some firms export
than in the closed economy, and there is the same level of wage inequality in the open economy
when all firms export as in the closed economy. It follows that wage inequality is at first increasing
in trade openness and later decreasing in trade openness. The intuition for these results stems
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from the increase in firm wages that occurs at the productivity threshold above which firms export,
which is only present when some but not all firms export. When no firm exports, a small reduction
in trade costs increases wage inequality, because it induces some firms to start exporting and raises
the wages paid by these exporting firms relative to domestic firms. When all firms export, a small
rise in trade costs increases wage inequality, because it induces some firms to stop exporting and
reduces the wages paid by these domestic firms relative to exporting firms.
Helpman et al. (2012) provide evidence on the quantitative importance of this new mechanism
for understanding the relationship between wage inequality and trade using Brazilian employer-
employee and trade transaction data. Consistent with the class of theoretical models discussed
above, wage inequality between firms within sector-occupations accounts for a substantial pro-
portion of the level and growth of overall wage inequality, and this between-firm wage inequality
remains important after controlling for observable worker characteristics. Estimating an extended
version of the structural model discussed above, they find that the model has substantial explana-
tory power for the distribution of wages across both firms and workers. To the extent that existing
empirical studies inspired by neoclassical trade theory focus on changes in relative wages between
different sectors and types of workers, they abstract from an important channel through which
trade liberalization can affect wage inequality.
Labor market frictions can also generate equilibrium unemployment. In this case, the opening
of trade can affect the distribution of income not only through the distribution of wages across em-
ployed workers but also through changes in unemployment. Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) develop
a heterogeneous firm model in which trade affects unemployment through reallocations of resources
across sectors. In contrast, Felbermayr et al. (2011) emphasize the role of the increases in average
industry productivity induced by trade liberalization in a heterogeneous firm model in reducing
effective search costs. Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) consider a two-country, two-sector model of
international trade. One sector is a homogeneous good sector, while the other sector is a differ-
entiated sector with heterogeneous firms. In both sectors, firms face search frictions in the labor
market. Differences in labor market institutions across countries and industries provide a source of
comparative advantage and shape the impact of trade liberalization on aggregate unemployment.50
Reductions in a country’s labor market frictions in the differentiated sector raise its own welfare,
by expanding the size of its differentiated sector and reducing its differentiated-sector price index.
50Another setting in which cross-country differences in labor market institutions can provide a source of comparative
advantage is where volatility varies across sectors, as in Cun˜at and Melitz (2010).
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This expansion in the differentiated sector in one country intensifies competition in the export
market faced by firms in the other country’s differentiated sector. As a result, the other country’s
differentiated sector contracts, which reduces its welfare. In contrast, proportional reductions in
labor market frictions in the differentiated sector in both countries raise welfare in each country,
by expanding the size of the differentiated sector in each country.
11 Conclusions
Motivated by a wealth of evidence from micro data, theoretical research in international trade
increasingly focuses on the decisions of heterogeneous firms. This theoretical research rationalizes
a number of features of disaggregated trade data (e.g. performance differences between exporters
and non-exporters), highlights new mechanisms through which trade affects welfare (e.g. reallo-
cation across firms and within-firm productivity growth), and points to new margins along which
economies respond to changes in trade costs (e.g. the extensive margins of the number of exporting
firms and exported products).
Although the theoretical literature on heterogeneous firms is already quite extensive, there are
many open areas for further research. The productivity of the firm remains largely a black box and
we still have relatively little understanding of the separate roles played by production technology,
management practice, firm organization and product attributes towards variation in revenues across
firms. Most existing research concentrates on heterogeneity in unit costs across firms, whereas firms
typically differ along a rich range of dimensions. More broadly, firms are complex organisms and
there remains scope for further research on the boundaries of the firm and the determinants of the
products, stages of production and workers that are included within a firm’s boundaries. Despite
some work on dynamics, much of the literature on firm heterogeneity and trade remains static,
and we have relatively little understanding of the processes through which large and successful
firms emerge and the implications of these processes for the transitional dynamics of the economy’s
response to trade liberalization. Finally, most extant research assumes that firms are atomistic,
whereas in reality large multinational corporations are unlikely to be of measure zero relative to
the markets in which they operate. The implications of firm heterogeneity in a world of granular
firms is an active area of ongoing research.
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